The Fourth Circuit Breaks Ranks in United
States v. Bryan: Finally, a Repudiation
of the Misappropriation Theory by Leuba, Sean P.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 3 Article 12
Summer 6-1-1996
The Fourth Circuit Breaks Ranks in United States v.
Bryan: Finally, a Repudiation of the
Misappropriation Theory
Sean P. Leuba
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sean P. Leuba, The Fourth Circuit Breaks Ranks in United States v. Bryan: Finally, a Repudiation of the
Misappropriation Theory, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1143 (1996),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol53/iss3/12
The Fourth Circuit Breaks Ranks in United
States v. Bryan: Finally, a Repudiation
of the Misappropriation Theory
Sean P. Leuba*
[M]isappropriation of information as the basis for insider trading
liability is a theory in search of a rationalization.
L Introduction
Generally, insider trading occurs when a party to a securities transac-
tion uses material nonpublic information in connection with a securities
trade.2 Congress has never codified an explicit definition of insider
trading.3 Rather, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses the
general antifraud provisions in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
* I wish to thank Professor Lyman P.Q. Johnson for his substantive guidance in
writing this Note, my parents for their continual support regardless of the endeavor, and my
beautiful wife for her endless encouragement.
1. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 874 (1996).
2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1189, 1193 (1995) (pro-
viding overview of insider trading).
3. See Barbara B. Aldave, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988: An Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALB. L. Rv. 893, 897-900 (1988) (describing lack
of any definition of insider trading in Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and
the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. Rv. 1, 2-3 (1982)
(discussing insider trading and lack of statutory definition). Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, sometimes called the short-swing profit rule, precludes officers,
directors, and ten-percent shareholders from profiting from securities transactions performed
within six months of each other. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16(b), 48
Stat. 881, 896 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994)). However, § 16(b) is not
comprehensive enough to prevent many fraudulent transactions. See Richard M. Phillips
& Robert J. Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 65, 71-72 (1984) (criticizing § 16(b) as ineffective because it only covers officers,
directors, and ten-percent shareholders and only applies to trades occurring within six
months of each other).
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Act of 19341 and Rule 10b-55 to enforce the prohibition against insider
trading.6
Under the Section and the Rule, two methods of enforcement have
developed: classical insider trading and the misappropriation theory.7 A
violation of classical insider trading is based on the relationship between
the parties to the transaction.8 A typical example of classical insider trading
involves a corporate official9 who trades in the corporation's shares on the
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)). Section 10(b) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995). Rule lob-5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
6. See Langevoort, supra note 3, at 2-3 (discussing how SEC enforces prohibition of
insider trading by use of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5). Professor Langevoort stated that because
there is no explicit statutory prohibition against insider trading except for § 16(b), the use
of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 for insider trading enforcement is of judicial and administrative
origin. Id.
7. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 187 (1991) (stating that there are two distinct bases of
liability under antifraud provisions: (1) classical or traditional theory; and (2) misappropriation
theory).
8. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (discussing fraud violation
premised on relationship between parties to securities transaction). In Chiarella, the Supreme
Court concluded that silence may be actionable under § 10(b) as a fraud. Id. However,
liability "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction." Id.
9. For purioses of this Note, a corporate official is an officer, director, or employee
privy to confidential information because of her position with the corporation.
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basis of material nonpublic information.' ° The corporate official owes a
fiduciary duty both to the corporation and to the shareholders." When
the official obtains material confidential information because of her position
and then trades in the shares of the company without disclosing that infor-
mation, she has breached the fiduciary obligation owed to the share-
holders. 2 Therefore, the explicit fraud requirements of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 are satisfied because the corporate official owed a duty to
disclose the confidential information or to abstain from trading in the shares
of the corporation.13
Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, however, a
person may violate Section 10(b) regardless of the relationship between the
parties to the securities transaction.' 4 The misappropriation theory permits
an individual to violate the antifraud provisions even though he does not
owe a fiduciary duty to the other participant in the securities transaction.'
5
The requisite fraud occurs when the violator misappropriates confidential
information entrusted to him and he subsequently trades on the basis of that
information.16 The violator needs only to breach a relationship of trust in
10. See infra text accompanying notes 134-52 (discussing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en band), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)). Texas Gulf
Sulphur is a prime example of classic insider trading.
11. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 4.1, at 141 (1986) (discussing fiduciary
duty owed by corporate officials). Clark stated that "[d]irectors, officers, and, in some situa-
tions, controlling shareholders owe their corporations, and sometimes other shareholders and
investors, a fiduciary duty of loyalty. This duty prohibits the fiduciaries from taking advantage
of their beneficiaries by means of fraudulent or unfair transactions." 1d.
12. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-30 (discussing breach of fiduciary duty between
corporate officials and shareholders when officials trade on material nonpublic information).
13. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 187-89 (examining classical insider trading and compan-
ion disclose or abstain rule).
14. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing elements of
misappropriation theory). The Ninth Circuit stated that:
Generally speaking, the theory provides that Rule 10b-5 is violated when a person
(1) misappropriates material non-public information (2) by breaching a duty arising
out of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a secu-
rities transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders
of the traded stock.
Id. at 443; see also David C. Bayne, The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: Chestman and the
'Misappropriation Theory,' 43 KAN. L. REV. 79, 87-88 (1994) (discussing how focus has
shifted from relationship between parties to securities transaction to source of information
under misappropriation theory).
15. See Clark, 915 F.2d at 443 (stating that existence of fiduciary duty between parties
to securities transaction is not element of misappropriation theory).
16. See Barbara B. Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading
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obtaining the information to trigger a violation of the antifraud provisions. 7
For example, consider a corporate official who purchases shares of a
second corporation knowing that his company recently awarded a large
manufacturing contract to the second corporation. The official owes no
duty of disclosure to the shareholders from whom he purchased the stock."
Therefore, the official would not violate Section 10(b) under classical
insider trading because an affirmative duty to disclose did not exist between
the parties. 9 However, under the misappropriation theory, the corporate
official is guilty under Section 10(b) because the requisite fraud is found
when the official misappropriates confidential information regarding the
manufacturing contract and trades in the shares of the second company. 20
Classical insider trading is a traditional and universally accepted meth-
od of enforcing the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.2'
The misappropriation theory does not hold nearly as much esteem.' The
on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 121 (1984) (discussing that requisite
fraud for Rule 10b-5 violation occurs when violator improperly uses confidential information
entrusted to him).
17. See id. (noting that violation occurs when perpetrator breaches duty of confidenti-
ality in obtaining information).
18. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 200 (stating that fraud recognized under misappropria-
tion theory is not based on duty to disclose or to abstain).
19. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that question of
affirmative duty of disclosure between parties to securities transaction is relevant only to
private actions under Rule 10b-5 and is not relevant when determining contravention of Rule
under misappropriation theory), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
20. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 159 (1991) (stating
that fraud occurs under misappropriation theory when violator uses confidential information
entrusted to her).
21. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980) (recognizing legiti-
macy of enforcement of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 premised on fiduciary obligation and
relationship between parties to securities transaction); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 847-53 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (finding that corporate officials using material
nonpublic information violated antifraud provisions by breaching fiduciary duty when trading
in corporation's stock), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 910-17 (1961) (finding that broker violated Rule lob-5 by trading on material
inside information given to him by member of company's board).
22. See Bayne, supra note 14, at 140-61 (criticizing misappropriation theory for,
among other reasons, contorting precedent and distorting relationship between fraud and
injury); Fisch, supra note 7, at 184 (criticizing entire doctrine of insider trading because it
has developed on "ad hoc" basis); Phillips & Zutz, supra note 3, at 90-93 (stating that
misappropriation theory has multiple problems including: (1) its emphasis on protecting
employers, not investors; (2) its inconsistency with Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); and
(3) its inapplicability to private actions); Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of
Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the SEC devel-
oped the misappropriation theory in the early 1980s' in response to the
Burger Court's retraction of Section 10(b) securities fraud enforcement
actions during the 1970s. The relatively recent creation of the theory has
gained acceptance only in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.' In
United States v. Bryan,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
misappropriation theory outright.27 This decision created a split in the
courts of appeals and seriously questioned the validity of the misappropria-
tion theory.
This Note analyzes the development of insider trading law culminating
with United States v. Bryan and determines whether the misappropriation
theory is a valid enforcement mechanism for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Part II discusses common-law fraud and its relationship to insider trading
223, 233-53 (1992) (declaring misappropriation theory flawed under legal, economic, and
ethical analysis). But see Aldave, supra note 16, at 102 (declaring that misappropriation
provides convincing argument for finding violation of Rule 10b-5).
23. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming application
of misappropriation theory), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1981) (declaring that day had come for court to address viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5 for misappropriated information and subsequently adopting misappropria-
tion theory), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
24. See Carlos J. Cuevas, The Misappropriation Theory and Rule 10b-5: Deadlock in
the Supreme Court, 13 J. CORP. L. 793, 807-08 (1988) (discussing Burger Court's retraction
of use of § 10(b) and subsequent development of misappropriation theory).
25. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408-10 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that Rule lob-5
can accommodate misappropriation theory and subsequently adopting theory), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449-53 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
misappropriation theory fits comfortably within Rule lob-5 and subsequently adopting
theory); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16-19 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting use of
misappropriation theory), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). There is some question
whether the Third Circuit has also adopted the theory. See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771
F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit stated that a person violates Rule lOb-5
when he breaches a duty of confidentiality to a corporation. Id. However, the court did
not directly adopt the misappropriation theory nor explicitly call it by name. Id.
26. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
27. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 952 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting use of
misappropriation theory). Elton Bryan worked for the State of West Virginia as the Director
of the West Virginia Lottery (Lottery). Id. at 936. Bryan manipulated two contracts
granted by the Lottery, one for advertising and one for the purchase of video lottery ma-
chines. Id. at 937-39. Using information entrusted to him, Bryan purchased shares in
companies doing business with the Lottery before the public announcement of the contracts.
Id. at 939. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
convicted Bryan on two counts of mail fraud, one count of wire fraud, one count of secu-
rities fraud, and one count of perjury. Id. at 936. The Fourth Circuit, rejecting the use of
the misappropriation theory, affirmed all but the securities fraud conviction. Id. at 939-60.
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enforcement.' Part III examines the Securities Act of 1933 and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 and discusses the promulgation of Rule lOb-5
and subsequent judicial interpretation.2 9 Part IV evaluates the expansion
of SEC interpretation and application of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.30
Part V analyzes the Burger Court's retraction of the application of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a reaction to the SEC's expansion.3' Part VI
explains the development of the misappropriation theory in the Second
Circuit as a response to Supreme Court decisions.32 Part VII studies the
Fourth Circuit's rejection of the misappropriation theory in United States
v. Bryan.33 In conclusion, Part VIII advocates rejecting the use of the
misappropriation theory.34
HI. Insider Trading at Common Law
Before passage of the Securities Act of 193335 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,36 actions for fraudulent nondisclosure were based
on the common-law action of deceit.37 However, an action in common-law
deceit for fraudulent nondisclosure required a breach of an affirmative duty
28. See infra notes 35-63 and accompanying text (discussing insider trading enforce-
ment using common-law action of deceit).
29. See infra notes 64-99 and accompanying text (examining Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5).
30. See infra notes 100-59 and accompanying text (evaluating interpretation and expan-
sion of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
31. See infra notes 160-289 and accompanying text (analyzing Burger Court's interpre-
tation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as retraction of application).
32. See infra notes 290-453 and accompanying text (explaining creation of misappro-
priation theory as response to Burger Court's retraction).
33. See infra notes 454-530 and accompanying text (studying rejection of misappropri-
ation theory in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).
34. See infra note 531 and accompanying text (advocating rejection of misappropria-
tion theory for § 10(b) enforcement).
35. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1994)).
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994)).
37. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 106,
at 737-38 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing fraudulent nondisclosure and its relationship to
common-law deceit). The elements of common-law deceit are: (1) a false representation of
a material fact, (2) made with scienter, (3) intended to cause reliance, (4) producing justifi-
able reliance that (5) causes damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977)
(stating elements of common-law deceit).
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to disclose.38 A very limited number of circumstances created an affirmative
duty to disclose. 39 For instance, a fiduciary obligation between the parties
to a securities transaction created a duty to disclose.' ° Yet, courts had
difficulty agreeing whether a fiduciary obligation existed between a corpora-
tion's officers and shareholders. 41 Three theories developed: the majority
view, the minority view, and the "special facts" doctrine.4'
The jurisdictions that subscribed to the majority view determined that
corporate officials owed a fiduciary obligation to the corporation and to the
shareholders only in the official's dealings with the corporation.43 Corporate
officials owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders involving transactions on
an individual level.' The majority view assumed that shareholders had
access to the corporate books.45 This access gave the shareholders con-
structive knowledge of the corporation's inside information.46 Therefore,
corporate officials using material nonpublic information could trade freely
in the shares of the corporation without any obligation to disclose the infor-
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 551(1) (discussing liabil-
ity for nondisclosure); KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, § 106, at 738-39 (discussing how
breach of affirmative duty to disclose might trigger deceit action).
39. See W. Page Keeton, Fraud - Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REv.
1, 11 (1936) (discussing exceptions to general rule of no duty to disclose).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 551(2)(a) (stating that
fiduciary relationship creates duty to disclose between parties to business transaction);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, § 106, at 738-39 (same).
41. See 5 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lob-5
§ 2.01[b], at 1.12 (2d ed. 1991) (evaluating conflict in jurisdictions over whether fiduciary
obligation existed between corporate officials and shareholders).
42. See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 768-70 (3d ed.
1995) (discussing majority view, minority view, and "special facts" doctrine that developed
in various jurisdictions).
43. See Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F.2d 303, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (stating that
officer is fiduciary to corporation but may still trade in shares of company). The court
declared that "while directors occupy a trust relation to the corporation, the same relation
does not exist as to stockholders - at least in the sale and purchase of their stock." Id. at
307.
44. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660-61 (Mass. 1933) (stating that no
fiduciary duty existed between directors and shareholders in securities transactions); Crowell
v. Jackson, 23 A. 426, 427 (N.J. 1891) (stating that prior to securities transaction, director
is not bound to disclose to individual shareholder information that may affect value of
shares).
45. See HowARD H. SPELLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE DiREc-
TOPS § 247, at 615 (1931) (stating that books are open to shareholders for inspection and
noting that shareholders may form their own opinions regarding proper value of corpora-
tion's shares).
46. See id. (discussing opportunity for shareholders to examine corporate books).
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mation to the shareholders.47
The minority view developed in response to the majority view in those
jurisdictions that disagreed with the majority view's willingness to allow
corporate officials to use material nonpublic information in securities
trades. 4 The minority view courts determined that officers and directors
were "quasi-trustees" of the shareholders' interests.49 Under the minority
view, a fiduciary obligation existed between the corporate officers and the
shareholders. 50 Therefore, the minority view jurisdictions required cor-
porate officials to disclose all material information prior to trading in the
shares of the corporation with a present shareholder.51
In Strong v. Repide,52 the Supreme Court developed a third view: the
special facts doctrine. 3 This theory occupied a middle ground between the
47. See Loss, supra note 42, at 768 (stating that directors were free to trade in
corporation's shares without disclosure in those jurisdictions adopting majority view).
48. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BAuLANTTNE ON CORPORATIONS § 80, at 212-13 (rev.
ed. 1946) (discussing how minority of courts considered majority theory lax because
majority theory did not protect trading public). Ballantine stated that the majority rule "may
be criticized as a rule of unconscionable laxity." Id. at 213.
49. See Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531, 534-35 (Kan. 1932) (comparing corporate
directors to trustees). The court noted that "[i]t is commonly said that directors of a
corporation are 'trustees' for stockholders." Id. at 535; see also Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E.
232, 233-34 (Ga. 1903) (comparing corporate directors to trustees). The court stated that
"the director is, in a most important and legitimate sense, trustee for the stockholder. Not
a strict trustee, . . . but a quasi trustee as to the shareholder's interest in the shares." Id.
(citation omitted).
50. See Hotchkiss, 16 P.2d at 535 (stating that corporate officers are fiduciaries). The
court declared that "[d]irectors act in a fiduciary capacity in management of corporate
affairs, and a director negotiating with a shareholder for purchase of shares acts in a relation
of scrupulous trust and confidence." Id.
51. See BALLANTINE, supra note 48, § 80, at 213 (discussing minority view and
fiduciary obligation that existed between officers and shareholders); Langevoort, supra note
3, at 5 (discussing existence of fiduciary obligation between officers and shareholders that
created affirmative duty to disclose).
52. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
53. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (stating that corporate director
has duty to disclose prior to securities transactions if certain special facts exist). In Strong,
the Supreme Court considered a fraud claim concerning a corporate director who purchased
shares of the same company. Id. at 428-35. The plaintiff, Eleanor Erica Strong, owned
800 shares of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company (Philippine Sugar Es-
tates). Id. at 421. The defendant, Repide, controlled three-quarters of the stock and was
also one of the five directors of the company. Id. The board elected Repide the agent and
administrator general of the company, granting him "exclusive intervention in the manage-
ment" of the corporation. Id. In 1903, Repide, as administrator general of Philippine Sugar
Estates, entered into negotiations with the United States to sell land the company owned in
the Philippines for a considerable sum. Id. at 424. Repide did not inform the other
1150
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limited disclosure of the majority view and the full disclosure of the
minority view.' The existence of certain special facts not discernible from
the company's books created an affirmative duty between corporate officials
and shareholders to disclose material nonpublic information prior to stock
transactions.' Such special facts might include a merger, an acquisition,
or any other important activity involving the corporation.56 The catalyst
of the securities transaction - the special facts - created the affirmative
duty to disclose.57
Eventually, the application of the three theories blurred. 8 Jurisdictions
that claimed to follow the majority view began to follow the special facts
shareholders about the negotiations. Id. The property in the Philippines was the company's
only asset of substantial value. Id. at 425. In September 1903, Repide, through an agent,
approached Strong concerning the availability of her 800 shares for purchase. Id. Repide's
agent and Strong's agent reached an agreement on October 10, 1903. Id. at 426. Repide's
agent never mentioned the prospective land sale to the United States. Id. The purchase
price for the 800 shares was $16,000 in Mexican currency. Id. On December 21, 1903,
Repide and the United States agreed to terms for the land owned by Philippine Sugar Es-
tates. Id. at 424. Repide obtained the 800 shares from Strong at one-tenth the price the
shares were worth after the consummation of the land sale. Id. at 426. The Court found
that Repide committed fraud by failing to disclose the land negotiations prior to the purchase
of Strong's stock. Id. at 433-34. The Court stated that there are certain special facts
regarding the value of the shares that create a duty to disclose before a director purchases
shares from a stockholder. Id. at 431. The possible land sale to the United States consti-
tuted a special fact that might affect the value of the shares, and therefore, Repide acted
fraudulently in his failure to disclose this information to Strong prior to the securities trans-
action. Id. at 431-34. The Court stated that "[i]f under all these facts he purchased the
stock from the plaintiff, the law would indeed be impotent if the sale could not be set aside
or the defendant cast in damages for his fraud." Id. at 433.
54. See Loss, supra note 42, at 769-70 (discussing special facts doctrine as intermedi-
ate position between majority and minority views).
55. See Strong, 213 U.S. at 431-32 (discussing certain special facts that create
obligation to disclose). The Supreme Court stated that:
If it were conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that the ordinary relations
between directors and shareholders in a business corporation are not of such a
fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to disclose to a shareholder
the general knowledge which he may possess regarding the value of the shares
of the company before he purchases any from a shareholder, yet there are cases
where, by reason of the special facts, such duty exists.
Id. at 431.
56. See BALLANTINE, supra note 48, § 80, at 213 (discussing special circumstances
that created fiduciary obligation between officers and shareholders).
57. See Strong, 213 U.S. at 431 (discussing special facts that created affirmative duty
to disclose between officer and shareholder).
58. See Loss, supra note 42, at 770 (discussing merging of majority, minority, and
special facts doctrines).
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doctrine.59 Courts increasingly began to describe the special facts doctrine
in terms indistinguishable from the minority view.' Yet, a few salient
requirements remained constant. First, if a cognizable claim in deceit for
fraudulent nondisclosure involving a securities transaction existed, it required
the breach of a fiduciary obligation between the corporate official and the
shareholder.6" Second, regardless of which view the jurisdiction applied,
the corporate official was under no obligation to disclose if the transaction
occurred on a stock exchange. 2 Finally, the corporate official owed no duty,
regardless of the jurisdiction, to the opposite party of the transaction if that
party was not a shareholder.63
III. The Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and Rule 10b-5
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 19331 (Securities Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (Exchange Act) in the wake of the disas-
trous 1929 stock market crash. 6 The insufficient protection that the common
59. See id. (discussing how courts that had previously adopted majority view started
using part of special facts doctrine).
60. See id. (stating that original special facts doctrine became very similar to minority
view as courts expanded circumstances that created special facts causing companion duty to
disclose).
61. See Keeton, supra note 39, at 11 (discussing requirement of fiduciary duty for
cognizable action in deceit for fraudulent nondisclosure).
62. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) (stating that heavy
burdens might discourage people from taking corporate office). The court stated that:
Purchases and sales of stock dealt in on the stock exchanges are commonly im-
personal affairs. An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could
neither buy nor sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corporation
without first seeking out the other actual -ultimate party to the transaction and
disclosing to him everything which a court or jury might later find that he then
knew affecting the real or speculative value of such shares. Business of that
nature is a matter to be governed by practical rules.
Id.; JACOBS, supra note 41, § 2.01[b], at 1.14 (discussing unavailability of action for
fraudulent nondisclosure if transaction occurred on securities exchange).
63. See 3 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1455 (2d ed. 1961) (discussing ab-
sence of duty to disclose if party opposite corporate official is not already shareholder).
64. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1994)).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994)).
66. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item
17 (J. Ellenberger & E. Maher comp. 1973) (discussing necessity of legislative action
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law provided to investors necessitated federal legislation.67 The Securities
Act concerns the registration of publicly distributed securities,6" while the
Exchange Act regulates postdistribution securities market transactions.69
Congress designed the statutes to promote market integrity and to increase
market participant confidence.7" The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]
fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a philos-
ophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."7' Con-
sistent with these objectives, Congress included antifraud provisions both
in the Securities Act and in the Exchange Act.' The sections relevant to
because of margin accounts, insider trading, failure of corporations to publish true nature
of financial condition, and rampant speculation prior to October 1929 crash). The Senate
report stated that:
By the development of the margin account, a great many people have been in-
duced to embark upon speculative ventures in which they were doomed to certain
loss. The unfair methods of speculation employed by large operators and those
possessing inside information regarding corporate affairs, and the failure of
corporations to publish full and fair reports of their financial conditions, have
also been contributing causes of losses to investors.
Id. at 3.
67. See Cuevas, supra note 24, at 795 (noting unsuitability of common-law fraud as
adequate remedy for insider trading on impersonal markets).
68. See Loss, supra note 42, at 34 (stating that Securities Act requires registration
with SEC of distributions of securities).
69. See id. (stating that Exchange Act targeted postdistribution trading). Professor
Loss also stated additional goals of the Exchange Act:
[T'he 1934 Act from the beginning has had three other themes: (1) regulation of
the exchange and over-the-counter markets; (2) prevention of fraud and market
manipulation; and (3) control of securities credit by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System as part of its authority over the Nation's credit gen-
erally.
Id.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE SECuRrriEs ACT OF 1933 AND SEcuRITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
Item 18 (J. Ellenberger & E. Maher comp. 1973) (discussing need to regulate securities
exchanges to cure defects that caused 1929 crash and to keep pace with modem trends).
71. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
72. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k (1994)); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 12, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1994)); Securities Act of 1933, cl. 38, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 9, 48
Stat. 881, 889 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1994)); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 15, 48 Stat. 881, 895 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o
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insider trading are Section 17(a)7 of the Securities Act and Sections 10(b)74
and 16(b)7 5 of the Exchange Act. Section 17(a) affects only the seller of
securities and, therefore, has a limited application.76 Section 16(b)'s reach
is also limited because it affects only officers, directors, or majority
shareholders that profit from short-swing trades.77 Because of its broad
language, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act therefore became the primary
enforcement mechanism to enforce the prohibition against insider trading.78
Congress included an important provision in Section 10(b) as a corollary
to the antifraud language. This provision authorizes the SEC to promulgate
rules in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 79 Pursuant to
this power, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-51 in 1942.1 The SEC modeled
(1994)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881, 896 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994)).
73. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 17(a), 48 Stat. at 84 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1994)).
74. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).
75. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16(b), 48 Stat. at 896 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994)).
76. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 17(a), 48 Stat. at 84 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994)) (limiting prohibition of fraud to sellers of securities, not pur-
chasers).
77. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404 § 16(b), 48 Stat. at 896 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)) (prohibiting officers, directors, and majority sharehold-
ers from profiting on short-swing trades). A short-swing trade is a buy/sell or sell/buy
occurring within six months of each other. An individual may violate this section in two
ways: First, if the violator purchases shares and then sells the stock within six months at a
profit, a violation occurs because of the actual profit. Second, if the violator sells shares prior
to a decrease in price and then the violator buys the stock back within six months, a violation
occurs because the violator owns the same stock but he has obtained a residual profit.
78. See Langevoort, supra note 3, at 2-3 (stating that modem law of insider trading
developed under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
79. See supra note 4 (providing text of § 10(b)).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lob-5 (1995); see supra note 5 (providing text of rule 10b-5).
81. See SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Milton Freeman, present at the promul-
gation of Rule lOb-5, tells of the Rule's inception:
It was one day in the year [1942], I was sitting in my office in the SEC
building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the
Director of Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the
telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the SEC Regional Administrator in
Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston who
is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at
$4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share
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Rule 10b-5 after Section 17(a) of the Securities Act but extended Section
17(a)'s prohibition of fraud beyond "sellers" of securities to "purchasers, "'
thereby curing Section 17(a)'s deficiency in coverage.A The SEC wrote Rule
10b-5 in very broad terms, and like the enabling statute, the Rule does not
expressly prohibit insider trading.' Rather, the SEC uses the Rule's general
antifraud provisions to enforce the prohibition against insider trading.'
Early decisions interpreting Rule lOb-5 did little to clarify the confusion
surrounding actions based on fraudulent nondisclosure.A6 However, two
for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs
and I called my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17,
and I put them together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the
end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calender, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper
around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how
it happened.
A.B.A. Sec. of Corp., Banking & Bus. Law, Conference on Codification of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967), reprinted in Loss, supra note 42, at 777.
82. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating
that SEC attempted, by promulgating Rule lOb-5, to make prohibitions in § 17(a) of Secu-
rifles Act applicable to purchasers). The Birnbaum court explained that "the Commission's
adoption of Rule X-10B-5, shows that the Commission was attempting only to make the
same prohibitions contained in Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act #pplicable to purchasers as well
as to sellers." Id.
83. See id. (discussing extension of "sellers" requirement to "purchasers"). The court
stated that "the SEC adopted Rule X-10B-5 to close this 'loophole in the protections against
fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying
securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase."' Id. (quoting SEC Release No. 3230
(May 21, 1942)).
84. See supra note 5 (providing text of Rule lOb-5).
85. See Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REv. 465, 466-67 (1990) (stating that Rule lOb-5 became predomi-
nant tool for use against insider trading).
86. See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960)
(stating that common law does not limit Rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). The
court stated that the Rule "greatly expands the protection frequently so hemmed in by the
traditional concepts of common-law misrepresentation and deceit . . . ." Id.; see also
Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (stating that common law does
not limit Rule lOb-5), aft'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam). The Connelly court
noted that:
It is not inconsistent with the view that Rule X-10b-5 cannot be limited by
common-law standards of deceit to say that the duty to speak which is imposed
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important cases demonstrated the continued prevalence of fraudulent non-
disclosure based on the breach of a fiduciary relationship.' In Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co. , the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania found that directors violated Rule lOb-5 when they
purchased shares of the corporation without disclosing material nonpublic
information. 9 In finding for the plaintiffs, the court determined that "the
broad terms of the [Exchange] Act are to be made effective in a case like
the present one through application of well known and well established equi-
table principles governing fiduciary relationships. "90 The court found that
the defendants breached this fiduciary relationship, thereby committing Rule
by the rule derives from those principles of equity which have enlarged the area
of recovery for fraudulent conduct beyond the narrow limits and rigid require-
ments of the old common-law action of deceit.
Id.; see also Tobacco and Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327
(D. Del. 1956) (stating that Rule lOb-5 is founded on common-law fraud), aff'd, 244 F.2d
902 (3d Cir. 1957); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del.)
(extending Rule lOb-5 to cover majority shareholders by using principles of equity, fiduciary
obligation, and "special circumstances"), supplemented, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa.) (discussing how
application of traditional principles of fiduciary relationships aid in enforcement of Exchange
Act), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
87. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.) (discussing
existence of fiduciary duty creating duty to disclose), supplemented, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D.
Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa.) (stating that
breach of fiduciary relationship in securities context violates Exchange Act), modified, 83
F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
88. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
89. See Kardon, 73 F. Supp. at 803 (discussing how breach of affirmative duty to
disclose is violation of Exchange Act). In Kardon, the court found a violation of Rule 10b-5
when two directors of a closely held corporation purchased the outstanding shares from the
other shareholders without disclosing a prearranged sale of the company's assets. Id. at
800-02. The plaintiffs, Morris and Eugene Kardon, and the defendants, Leon and William
Slavin, were equal co-owners in Western Board and Paper Company. Id. at 800. All sat
on the board of directors and were officers of the company. Id. On March 18, 1946, the
Slavins purchased the Kardons' shares for $504,000. Id. at 801. Prior to the consummation
of the stock sale, Leon Slavin had covertly arranged to sell Western Board and Paper
Company's plant and equipment to National Gypsum Company for $1,500,000. Id. at 800.
Slavin never mentioned the proposed asset sale to National Gypsum during negotiations for
the purchase of the Kardons' stock. Id. at 801. The court found that the defendants
violated Rule lob-5 and explained that "[u]nder any reasonable liberal construction, these
provisions [of Rule lOb-5] apply to directors and officers who, in purchasing the stock of
the corporation from others, fail to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of
their position, which would materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transac-
tion." Id. at 800.
90. Id. at 803.
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10b-5 fraud by purchasing the shares without disclosing information regard-
ing the sale of the company.9
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp. ,9 the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware examined a Rule lOb-5 claim involving a majority
shareholder who purchased a minority stockholder's shares without disclosing
material nonpublic information known only because of majority status.93
In deciding for the minority stockholder, the court relied both on a breach
of fiduciary obligation and on principles of equity. 4 The district court
91. See id. at 802 (finding violation of Rule 10b-5). The court stated that:
The plaintiffs' case was established when the defendants' duty and its breach were
proved. This was done by showing that the defendants were officers and directors
of Western and that they disposed of the bulk of the corporate assets to an outsider,
for their own benefit, without disclosing the transaction to the plaintiffs or giving
them an opportunity to participate in it.
Id.
92. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
93. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-33 (D. Del.) (evaluating
minority shareholder Rule lOb-5 claim against majority), supplemented, 100 F. Supp. 461
(D. Del. 1951). In Speed, the court considered a Rule 10b-5 claim against majority share-
holders who purchased shares of the minority without disclosing information affecting the
value of the shares known only to the majority by virtue of their position. Id. at 816-32.
The plaintiff, William S. Speed, was a minority shareholder in Axton-Fisher Tobacco
Company (Axton). Id. at 812. Transamerica, the defendant, was the majority shareholder
of Axton. Id. On November 12, 1942, Transamerica offered to purchase Class A shares
of Axton for $40 and Class B shares for $12. Id. Speed subsequently sold his shares to
Transamerica. Id. Transamerica offered to purchase the shares knowing that Axton's
inventory was significantly undervalued. Id. Transamerica gained this information by its
position as majority shareholder. Id. The true value of the shares was more than $200 for
Class A shares and over $100 for Class B shares. Id. Transamerica desired to profit from
the stock purchase by eventually merging with Axton or dissolving the corporate assets for
their true value. Id. The court found that Transamerica violated Rule 10b-5 by purchasing
the minority's shares without disclosing the true value of the stock. Id. at 828-29. The
court wrote that:
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to
purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affect-
ing the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside
position but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which information
would have affected the judgment of the sellers.
Id.
94. See id. at 829 (relying on principles of fiduciary duty and fairness). The court
stated that:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider
from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority
shareholders. It is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization in bargaining
position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such
1157
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143 (1996)
extended fiduciary obligations beyond the traditional scope of directors and
corporate officials to include majority stockholders.95 Although the court
found that the majority shareholder had a duty to disclose and partially based
its decision on principles of fairness, fraudulent nondisclosure based on the
existence of a fiduciary relationship still formed the foundation of its finding
a Rule lOb-5 violation.
96
Although courts interpreted the scope and limitations of Rule 10b-5
differently, the concept of a fraudulent nondisclosure violation based on a
fiduciary relationship remained somewhat consistent.' Absent the breach
of an affirmative duty to disclose based on a fiduciary duty, courts were
unlikely to find a Rule lOb-5 violation.9" If the SEC wanted to fully effectu-
ate the "any person" prohibition described in Rule 10b-5, 99 then an expansion
of insider trading law was necessary.
IV. Expansion of Rule 10b-5 Interpretation
The first significant expansion of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 applica-
tion occurred in the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co."o Robert
M. Gintel was a partner and a selling broker of the firm Cady, Roberts &
Co. 1 ' From early November 1959 through November 23, 1959, Gintel
purchased approximately eleven thousand shares of Curtis-Wright Corpora-
tion stock for accounts Gintel represented."° On November 24, 1959, press
reports circulated concerning a new type of internal-combustion engine devel-
oped by Curtis-Wright.103 On the same day, the stock closed three and one-
transaction. Some courts have called this a fiduciary duty while others state it is
a duty imposed by the "special circumstances." One of the primary purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq., was to outlaw the use
of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own
financial advantage to the detriment of uninformed public security holders.
Id.
95. See id. (stating that Rule lOb-5 violation occurs when majority shareholders
purchase shares from minority stockholders without disclosing material facts).
96. See id. (discussing how fiduciary duty creates affirmative duty to disclose).
97. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 3, at 74 (stating that early cases relied on fiduciary
duty to create affirmative duty to disclose).
98. See id. (finding that fiduciary duty requirement remained important).
99. See supra note 5 (providing text of Rule 10b-5).
100. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see Bayne, supra note 14, at 93 (stating that "Cady, Roberts
is undoubtedly the bellwether of the modem law of Insider Trading").





quarter points higher, at 35 1/4.11 Slowly, Gintel began to sell off some
of the Curtis-Wright shares."° While Gintel proceeded to sell, the stock
price continued to increase, and the stock reached a high of 40 3/4 on the
morning of November 25th.1" Also on November 25th, the Curtis-Wright
board of directors met to discuss the declaration of a quarterly dividend."°
In the first three quarters of 1959, Curtis-Wright had paid a dividend of
$0.625 per share. 10 Nevertheless, the board decided to pay a dividend of
only $0.375 for the fourth quarter."° J. Cheever Cowdin was a director of
Curtis-Wright and also a representative of Cady, Roberts & Co." 0 After
the board decided on the fourth quarter dividend and prior to the public
announcement of the reduction, Cowdin telephoned Cady, Roberts & Co.
and left Gintel a message informing him of the reduced dividend."' Gintel
discovered the message prior to the public announcement of the dividend
cut and entered a sell order of two thousand shares and a short-sell order
of five thousand shares of Curtis-Wright stock."' Curtis-Wright shares
closed at 34 7/8 on November 25, 1959."1
Chairman Cary began the SEC opinion by stating that the antifraud
provisions "are broad remedial provisions aimed at reaching misleading or
deceptive activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically suffi-
cient to sustain a common-law action for fraud and deceit."" l4 The Commis-
sioner found that, regarding misrepresentations, Rule lOb-5 applied to "any
person," as the Section and Rule state, regardless of the identity of the










113. Id. at 910.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 911 (stating that "any person" may violate antifraud provisions if based
on actual misrepresentation). The Commission stated that:
Section 17 and Rule lOb-5 apply to securities transactions by "any person."
Misrepresentations will lie within their ambit, no matter who the speaker may be.
An affirmative duty to disclose material information has been traditionally imposed
on corporate "insiders," particularly officers, directors, or controlling shareholders.
We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts
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"particularly officers, directors, or controlling shareholders," '116 traditionally
possessed an affirmative duty of disclosure.I 7 This affirmative duty was a
"special obligation" of corporate insiders. 8 However, these three groups
of corporate insiders were not the only individuals with this special obligation
of disclosure." 9 A two-element analysis determined whether this heightened
duty applied to other parties.1" The first element examined the existence
of a relationship granting access to corporate information, and the second
element studied the inherent unfairness of informational disadvantage.'
The SEC concluded that Gintel violated Rule 10b-5 and Sections 10(b)
and 17(a) when he sold Curtis-Wright shares prior to the public announce-
ment of the dividend cut." Cary determined that Gintel possessed charac-
teristics similar to individuals classified as corporate insiders." The SEC
stated that Cowdin's status as a board member clearly prohibited him from
selling Curtis-Wright shares prior to the announcement of the dividend cut. 24
By extension, the SEC reasoned that Gintel gained insider status because of
a relationship providing him with confidential information, and accordingly,
this relationship precluded Gintel from selling Curtis-Wright shares."z
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to
persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a violation
of the antifraud provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to effecting a
purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we
believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.
Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. (discussing heightened duty of affirmative disclosure for corporate insid-
ers).
118. See id. at 912 (evaluating "special obligation" of corporate insiders).
119. See id. (discussing others who possess special obligation of disclosure).
120. See id. (stating two-element evaluation for special obligation status).
121. See id. (describing two-element evaluation). Chairman Cary stated that:
[Ihe obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
Id.
122. Id. at 911.





In re Cady, Roberts & Co. produced several developments in Section
10(b) interpretation and its relation to insider trading enforcement. The SEC
expanded the group of persons who possess an affirmative duty to disclose
confidential information1a Traditionally, only corporate insiders possessed
this special obligation. 27 After the Cady, Roberts decision, individuals nor-
mally not considered insiders who satisfied the two-part analysis possessed
an affirmative duty of disclosure." This idea was progressive for two
reasons: First, the two-part analysis contained a fairness component. 29 The
SEC's decision to partly base an affirmative obligation to disclose on concepts
of fairness had a tremendous impact on subsequent insider trading enforce-
ment actions.' Second, the SEC found a violation of the antifraud pro-
visions despite the absence of a fiduciary relationship between Gintel and the
Curtis-Wright stock purchasers.' The determination that a violation of the
antifraud provisions had occurred notwithstanding the lack of a fiduciary duty
was a departure from prior Rule 10b-5 decisions.' In re Cady, Roberts &
Co. was a revolutionary case for securities fraud enforcement and provided
the framework for further expansion of the insider trading doctrine.'
126. See id. (discussing expansion of class of individuals possessing special obligation).
127. See id. (stating that corporate insiders traditionally possess special obligation).
128. See id. (providing how non-insider may possess special obligation).
129. See id. (stating that second element of special obligation analysis examines
fairness).
130. See Bayne, supra note 14, at 105 (stating that fairness element of Cady, Roberts
had tremendous impact on insider trading law); Cuevas, supra note 24, at 800 (noting that
Cady, Roberts was first case to extend Rule lOb-5 to non-insiders).
131. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and
the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L.
REV. 775, 794 (1988) (discussing lack of fiduciary duty between Gintel and purchasers).
In Cady, Roberts, the SEC rejected arguments that Gintel did not owe a duty of disclosure
because of a lack of fiduciary duty. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-13
(1961). Chairman Cary determined that Gintel possessed the special obligation of an insider
because he satisfied the two-part analysis. Id. at 911. It did not matter that Gintel de-
frauded purchasers instead of present shareholders of Curtis-Wright. Id. at 913. The SEC
stated that:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that an
officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders
from whom he purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is
clearly not appropriate to introduce these into the broader antifraud concepts em-
bodied in the securities acts.
Id. at 913-14.
132. See Mitchell, supra note 131, at 794 (claiming that violation without companion
breach of fiduciary duty is substantial break with past interpretations of Rule lOb-5).
133. See id. at 789 (stating importance of Cady, Roberts). Mitchell stated that "[t]he
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In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,"' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit expanded the policies and guidelines delineated in
Cady, Roberts.' Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS) performed mineral
exploration in eastern Canada beginning in 1957.136 In March 1959, aerial
geophysical surveys detected unusual conductivity in a tract of land near
Timmins, Ontario (the Kidd 55 segment)." 7 On November 8, 1963, explora-
tory drilling of the Kidd 55 segment began at drill hole K-55-1 .138 The
extraordinary mineral results of K-55-1 convinced TGS executives to acquire
the entire Kidd 55 tract and to keep the information confidential, even from
other TGS employees, officers, and directors. 39 After the acquisition of the
entire tract in March 1964, TGS completed several more exploratory holes,
all with similarly outstanding results.Y Finally, on April 16, 1964, TGS
publicly disclosed the discovery of a mineral strike of at least twenty-five
million tons of ore - a very substantial amount - on the Kidd 55 tract. "4'
During the period between the mineral discovery on the Kidd 55 tract
and the public announcement of the ore strike, several TGS directors pur-
chased TGS shares or stock call options without disclosing the ore strike to
the seller. 42 TGS officials also relayed information about the Kidd 55 strike
to third parties, who subsequently traded on the basis of that information. 43
The price of TGS shares rose from 18 points on Friday, November 15, 1963,
importance of this opinion cannot be underestimated, because it served as the keystone for
the development of both the Supreme Court's and the Second Circuit's jurisprudential ap-
proaches." 1d.
134. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
135. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(expanding on Cady, Roberts), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); John F. Olson et al.,
Recent Insider Trading Developments: The Search for Clarity, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 715, 720
(1991) (stating that Texas Gulf Sulphur expanded on SEC's analysis in Cady, Roberts);
Phillips & Zutz, supra note 3, at 75 (stating that Second Circuit adopted and expanded on
Cady, Roberts approach).
136. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The court stated that "[tihese results were so remarkable that neither Clayton,
an experienced geophysicist, nor four other TGS expert witnesses, had ever seen or heard
of a comparable initial exploratory drill hole in a base metal deposit." 1d.
140. Id. at 844.
141. Id. at 846.
142. Id. at 840-46. A call option is a contract in which the bearer may purchase a fixed
number of particular shares from the seller at a set price on or before a certain date. 1d.
at 841 n.3.
143. Id. at 840-44.
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to 36 3/8 points on April 16, 1964, the day of the Kidd 55 mineral deposit
announcement. 1" The share price reached 58 1/4 points by May 15, 1964.145
The SEC claimed multiple violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
and brought an action against TGS and several of its officers, directors, and
employees.'" The Second Circuit evaluated the complaint, expanded on the
SEC's interpretation given in Cady, Roberts, and found several violations
of Rule lOb-5.147 According to the court, the proposition that all investors
should have "relatively equal access to material information" formed Rule
lOb-5's foundation.'" The appellate court based a substantial amount of its
reasoning on Cady, Roberts, but went beyond the SEC's definition of an
insider and expanded the SEC's application of the Rule.'4 9 Under the Second
Circuit's analysis, Rule lob-5 required anyone possessing material inside
information, regardless of its origin, to disclose that information or to refrain
from trading.5 0 The court determined that the Cady, Roberts "disclose or
abstain" rule' did not go far enough, and consequently, the court of appeals
144. Id. at 847.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 839.
147. See id. at 848 (discussing and expanding on interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5 given by Chairman Cary in Cady, Roberts).
148. See Id. (evaluating policy behind Rule 10b-5). The court stated that:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, in trading for his own account in the
securities of a corporation has "access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone" may not take "advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."
Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
149. Compare SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (stating that group covered by Rule lOb-5 extends beyond traditional group of insiders
to anyone possessing material inside information), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) with
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (stating that insiders are composed
of group of traditional insiders, i.e., officers, directors, controlling shareholders, and
individuals with relationships granting them access to material confidential corporate
information).
150. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (analyzing application of Rule lOb-5).
The court stated that, under the Rule:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to
the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in
or recommending the securities concerned while such information remains undis-
closed.
Id. (emphasis added).
151. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911 (stating that insiders must disclose material
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extended the Rule's application to anyone who possessed material inside
information. 152
After Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur, the application of Rule
10b-5 evolved from determining how the violator obtained the information
to an analysis of the information itself. 53 If the perpetrator possessed
material nonpublic information and did not disclose or abstain from trading,
a Rule 10b-5 violation would occur regardless of the source of the informa-
tion, whether it occurred on an exchange, or whether it occurred in the
absence of a fiduciary duty." The Second Circuit's progressive rule is
commonly termed the "parity of information" or "equal access" theory. 5
The impetus behind this approach was "the plight of the buying public -
wholly unprotected from the misuse of special information." 56 This theory
radically departed from the common law and was a substantial evolution
from the pre-Cady, Roberts interpretation of Rule 10b-5.157 Subsequent cases
affirmed this new interpretation.158 However, this novel approach lasted only
until the Supreme Court established that a breach of an affirmative duty to
disclose between parties to a securities transaction must occur prior to finding
a Rule lOb-5 violation based on fraudulent nondisclosure.159
information or abstain from trading).
152. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (stating that anyone, not just someone
strictly termed "insider," must disclose material inside information or abstain from trading);
Cuevas, supra note 24, at 801 (naming Texas Gulf Sulphur as landmark case because it
applied Rule lOb-5 to nontraditional insiders).
153. See Mitchell, supra note 131, at 778 (discussing competing approaches to Rule
lOb-5 interpretation and concluding that Texas Gulf Sulphur epitomizes possession ap-
proach).
154. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(extending duty to disclose or to abstain to anyone, not just insiders), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
155. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1194 (claiming that "Texas Gulf Sulphur rested
on a policy of equality of access to infornation"); Bayne, supra note 14, at 111 (stating that
Texas Gulf Sulphur rule "has now become the somewhat pejorative 'parity of information
theory"').
156. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961); see supra notes 129-33
and accompanying text (discussing fairness element of Cady, Roberts analysis).
157. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 3, at 78 (claiming that Second Circuit tremen-
dously broadened scope of insider trading enforcement).
158. See generally, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978)
(supporting disclose or abstain requirement delineated in Texas Gulf Sulphur), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974) (same); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1972) (same).
159. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-36 (1980) (establishing breach
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V. Retraction of Rule 10b-5 Application
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court limited the scope of
Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 liability created by the broad interpretation
of the SEC and the Second Circuit."6 In each of the following cases, the
Court reverted back to the statutory language and consistently held that
fraud, determined by the language of Section 10(b), 16 1 must exist before a
violation of Rule lOb-5 occurs. 62 The Court repeatedly refused to consider
vague notions of fairness or ethics, and stated that Section 10(b) was not a
regulatory mandate to enforce the SEC's interpretation of fairness in business
transactions.' 63
A. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,'" the Supreme Court held
that only actual purchasers or sellers had standing to bring a private damages
action under Rule 10b-5.' Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
of fiduciary duty between parties to securities transaction as requisite for Rule lOb-5
violation for nondisclosure).
160. See Cuevas, note 24, at 801-03 (discussing how Supreme Court limited applica-
tion of Rule 10b-5).
161. See supra note 4 (providing text of § 10(b)).
162. See Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to
Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L.
REV. 139, 153 (1995) (stating that Court consistently required showing of fraud for § 10(b)
violation).
163. See id. at 152 (claiming that Court refused to apply "business ethics" to circumvent
statutory mandate).
164. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
165. See Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (holding
that only purchasers or sellers had standing to bring private action under Rule lOb-5). In
Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court considered whether a private plaintiff possessed
standing to bring a Rule lob-5 action against a seller even though the plaintiff did not pur-
chase any stock. Id. at 727. Blue Chip Stamp Company (Blue Chip) sold trading stamps
wholesale to retailers. Id. at 725. Pursuant to a consent decree reached after the United
States filed a civil antitrust complaint against Blue Chip, the company offered a substantial
amount of its shares to retailers who did not own stock prior to the antitrust action. Id. at
726. Prior to the offering, Blue Chip prepared and distributed a prospectus to all offerees.
Id. Manor Drug Stores (Manor Drug), a stamp retailer, received a prospectus but did not
purchase any Blue Chip stock. Id. at 727. Two years after the offering, Manor Drug
brought a Rule lob-5 action against Blue Chip claiming that the prospectus contained mater-
ial misleading information about the future of Blue Chip. Id. at 726. Manor Drug alleged
that Blue Chip intentionally deceived stamp retailers in hopes that they would not purchase
Blue Chip stock so that Blue Chip could later sell the shares on the open market for a pre-
mium. Id. The Supreme Court held that only purchasers or sellers may maintain a private
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noted that Rule lOb-5 was "a judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn. ''" The importance of Blue Chip Stamps stems from
the Court's restrictive approach to Rule lOb-5 interpretation. The Court
granted standing for a Rule lOb-5 civil action only to purchasers or sellers
and thereby eliminated three groups of potential plaintiffs. 67 The Court
removed these plaintiffs from Rule lOb-5 civil actions notwithstanding the
inherent unfairness of denying them a remedy and concluded that consider-
ations of statutory interpretation, legislative choices, precedent, and policy
dictated this restrictive ruling. 6' Although Blue Chip Stamps primarily
concerned questions of standing, it is an important decision because of its
restrictive ruling and its rejection of fairness as a principal consideration.' 69
B. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,"70 the Supreme Court considered
whether a plaintiff could bring a private cause of action under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 for negligent nonfeasance rather than fraud.171 Finding it
Rule lOb-5 action. Id. at 749. The Court relied on and accepted the rule of Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), which states that only actual purchasers
or sellers can bring a private Rule 10b-5 action (Birnbaum rule). Id. at 730-49. The Court
also considered: (1) historical interpretations that Rule lOb-5 does not have an explicit
private right of action; (2) that when Congress desired to give others besides purchasers and
sellers a right to action it did so expressly; and (3) the concern over vexatious litigation.
Id. at 728-49.
166. Id. at 737.
167. See id. at 737-38 (discussing possible plaintiffs excluded from bringing Rule 10b-5
action because of Court's acceptance of Birnbaum rule). The three groups excluded from
bringing a private Rule lob-5 action include: (1) potential purchasers -of shares who are
dissuaded because of a gloomy prospectus; (2) actual shareholders who do not sell; and
(3) shareholders or creditors who lost value due to activities that violate Rule lob-5. Id.
168. See id. at 728-54 (discussing reasons why Court applied Birnbaum rule).
169. See id. at 732-35 (stating that specific wording of § 10(b) and language of other
sections of Securities Act and Exchange Act require rule that Rule lob-5 plaintiffs be actual
purchasers or sellers because Congress explicitly provided same right to others in different
situations).
170. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
171. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (discussing whether
negligence is proper basis for Rule lob-5 action). In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
considered a Rule lob-5 claim against an accounting firm that represented a brokerage house
which defrauded investors. Id. at 188-214. Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm, represented
the brokerage firm of First Securities Company of Chicago (First Securities). Id. at 188.
Leston B. Nay, the owner of 92% of First Securities stock, perpetrated a fraud on investors
by inducing them to invest in high-yield accounts. Id. at 189. In reality, the accounts
did not exist and Nay purloined the funds for his own use. Id. Nay committed the fraud
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important to determine the meaning of "any manipulative or deceptive
device,""f the Court began its analysis with an evaluation of the language
of Section 10(b).11 The Court stated that the particular language of the
statute "strongly suggest[s] that [Section] 10(b) was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional misconduct."" After rejecting the SEC's arguments,
the Court determined that the language of Section 10(b) "clearly connotes
intentional misconduct."'" Concluding its statutory analysis, the Court then
considered the statute's legislative history to determine whether support
existed for predicating a Rule lOb-5 action on negligence., 6 Finding no
support in the legislative history for such a claim, the Court determined that
only willful or intentional misconduct could form the basis of a Rule 10b-5
action. '77
Hochfelder is an important decision for Section 10(b) analysis. The
Court rejected an "effects" oriented approach.77 The SEC, in an amicus
curiae brief, argued that the Court should allow a Rule lOb-5 action to pro-
ceed based on negligence because of the effect that negligence has on
investors.7 9 The SEC claimed that the Rule's purpose was to protect the
public, regardless of whether the conduct was intentional or negligent,
because of the similar effect both had on the public.'t8 Finding the SEC's
between 1942 and 1966. Id. Final discovery occurred in 1968, after Nay's suicide. Id.
The investors brought a Rule lOb-5 action against Ernst & Ernst and claimed that the
accounting firm aided and abetted Nay's fraud by its failure to perform proper audits. Id.
The plaintiffs' cause of action rested on negligent nonfeasance. Id. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, held that Rule lOb-5 and § 10(b) require a
showing of willful or intentional conduct. Id. at 199-201. The Court relied on the plain
language of the statute and the lack of any legislative history granting relief based on
negligence. Id. at 197-214. The Supreme Court determined that Congress fully intended
that a § 10(b) violation requires willful or intentional conduct and concluded that Rule lOb-5
could not exceed the statutory mandate. Id.
172. See id. at 197 (discussing meaning of "manipulative or deceptive device").
173. Id. (stating that "[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of
a statute is the language itself" (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))); see supra note 4 (providing text of
§ 10(b)).
174. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.
175. Id. at 201.
176. See id. at 201-14 (analyzing legislative histories of Securities Act and Exchange
Act).
177. See id. (finding no support for plaintiff's claim and holding that Rule lob-5 action
requires willful or intentional misconduct).
178. See id. at 197-99 (rejecting Commission's "effects" approach).
179. See id. at 198 (discussing effects approach).
180. See id. (claiming purpose of effects approach was to protect public). The Court
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argument illogical and stretched beyond the statute's plain meaning, the
Court completely rejected the effects approach. 181
The importance of the Court's rejection of the effects oriented
approach cannot be overstated. First, concern over the effects of trading
on material nonpublic information drove the fairness element in Cady,
Roberts82 and resulted in Rule 10b-5's expansion in Texas Gulf Sulphur
to include "anyone," not simply corporate insiders.' 83 Second, the Court's
refusal to stray from the statutory underpinnings gives Hochfelder additional
importance.'I 4 The Court began its analysis with the statute"s and refused
to grant Rule 10b-5 an application beyond the organic statute's scope.'86
The refusal to accept the SEC's effects approach and the Court's consistent
statutory interpretation provided important precedent for later decisions
interpreting the Rule and its application.
stated that "[tihe Commission then reasons [in its amicus curiae brief] that since the
'effect' upon investors of given conduct is the same regardless of whether the conduct is
negligent or intentional, Congress must have intended to bar all such practices and not just
those done knowingly or intentionally." Id.
181. See id. 198-99 (rejecting effects approach). The Court asserted that:
The logic of the effect-oriented approach would impose liability for wholly
faultless conduct where such conduct results in harm to investors, a result the
Commission would be unlikely to support. But apart from where logic might
lead, the Commission would add a gloss to the operative language of the
statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.
Id.
182. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (discussing fairness element of
Cady, Roberts decision).
183. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of Rule
lOb-5 in Texas Gulf Sulphur to include persons not normally considered traditional
insiders).
184. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-201 (1976) (basing decision
primarily on statutory interpretation).
185. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting that Court begins analysis
with statute).
186. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 213-14 (confining Rule lob-5 application to limits
of § 10(b)). The Court stated that:
The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it
is "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as
expressed by the statute." Thus, despite the broad view of the Rule advanced
by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress under § 10(b).
Id. at 214 (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).
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C. Santa Fe Industries v. Green
In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,87 the Supreme Court considered the
scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of a corporation that
performed a Delaware short-form merger intended to eliminate the minority
shareholders. 88 The Court did not find Santa Fe Industries (Santa Fe)
liable under Rule 10b-5 because Santa Fe did not engage in any manipula-
tive or deceptive practices.' 89 Even assuming the truth of the minority
shareholders' allegations concerning the grossly undervalued share price,
the Court refused to find a Rule 10b-5 violation based on Santa Fe's con-
duct."9 A detailed statutory analysis, similar to Hochfelder's analysis,
formed the basis of the opinion."'9 The Court began by stating that the
language of Section 10(b) determines the meaning of fraud under Rule
10b-5.' 91 The underlying statute, Section 10(b), requires a "manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
" 19 of SEC rules. 194
187. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
188. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464-65 (1977) (presenting question
of application of Rule lOb-5 in context of Delaware short-form merger). In Santa Fe
Industries, the Supreme Court held that absent a specific showing of intentional miscon-
duct, minority shareholders had no recourse under Rule lOb-5 when majority shareholders
executed a proper Delaware short-form merger. Id. at 474-77. Santa Fe Industries (Santa
Fe) acquired 95% ownership of Kirby Lumber Corp. (Kirby), a Delaware corporation,
by 1973. Id. at 465. In 1974, Santa Fe, wishing to own all of Kirby's stock, performed
a short-form merger. Id. A Delaware short-form merger allows a company owning at
least 90% of a subsidiary company to merge the subsidiary into the first company. Id.
The short-form merger requires neither the notice nor the approval of the minority share-
holders. Id. However, the majority must notify the minority within 10 days and offer to
buy the minority's shares. Id. If the minority is dissatisfied with the offer, they may
petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for review. Id. Santa Fe offered $150 per share
to the minority after an appraisal valued the stock at $125 per share. Id. at 466. The
minority believed that the proper value was $772 per share. Id. at 467. However, they
did not ask for review in Delaware but brought an action under Rule lOb-5 in federal
district court. Id. The complaint asserted that Santa Fe wanted to freeze out minority
shareholders, to obtain a fraudulent appraisal of Kirby's worth, and to mislead minority
shareholders. Id. The Supreme Court found that Santa Fe did not violate Rule lob-5.
Id. at 480. The Court relied on a statutory analysis and determined that the short-form
merger was neither deceptive nor manipulative. Id. at 473-74. See § 253 of Delaware
General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Supp. 1982), for the
short-form merger procedure.*
189. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74 (finding Santa Fe not liable under Rule lOb-5).
190. See id. (noting Santa Fe's conduct did not violate Rule lOb-5).
191. See id. at 471-77 (analyzing § 10(b) in detail).
192. See id. at 472 (stating that § 10(b) language, particularly words "manipulative"
and "deceptive," defines fraud under Rule lOb-5).
193. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified
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Therefore, a fraudulent act within Rule lOb-5 requires manipulation or
deception."g The Court did not find that Santa Fe's behavior established
a Rule lOb-5 violation because Santa Fe did not engage in any manipulative
or deceptive practices.196
The Santa Fe decision continued the Burger Court's restrictive inter-
pretation of Rule 10b-5. '" The Court again performed a detailed statutory
analysis, and the limited interpretation of fraud under the Rule - defined
as "manipulative or deceptive" - formed the basis of the decision. 198 Con-
cerns for marketplace fairness and business ethics were again subordinate
to the statutory language of Section 10(b). 199
D. Chiarella v. United States
In the watershed case of Chiarella v. United States,' the Supreme
Court considered the application of Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) to a
financial printer who used material nonpublic information obtained through
his employment to trade in the shares of companies that were targets of
tender offers. 1 Vincent Chiarella worked for Pandick Press, a printer of
financial documents.' Chiarella processed documents relating to corporate
takeover bids.' s These documents had blank spaces where the company
names were to later appear, but Chiarella discerned the applicable companies
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)); see supra note 4 (providing text of § 10(b)).
194. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1976) (stating that "the claim
of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any part of
Rule lob-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive'
within the meaning of the statute").
195. See id. (defining fraud under Rule lob-5 as manipulation or deception).
196. See id. at 474 (stating that Santa Fe did not commit violation of Rule lOb-5).
197. See Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 162, at 154-55 (stating that Court once again
refused to stray from statutory language of Rule lob-5 and did not want to creatively ad-
judicate where Congress did not legislate).
198. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474 (finding no manipulative or deceptive behavior and
concluding that no violation of Rule lOb-5 occurred).
199. See id. at 473 (analyzing statute and congressional intent). The Court stated that
"[t]he language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct
not involving manipulation or deception. Nor have we cited any evidence in the legislative
history that would support a departure from the language of the statute." Id.
200. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
201. See Chiarefla v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224-38 (1980) (considering whether
Rule lob-5 applied to employee who obtained information regarding tender offers of other
corporations through his employment).




from other information.' After determining the target company, Chiarella
then purchased shares of that company and subsequently sold the stock after
the takeover offer became public.' The transactions produced a profit of
over $30,000 in fourteen months.' The SEC initiated an investigation and
Chiarella agreed to a consent decree in May 1977.1 In January 1978, the
United States indicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of violating Rule 10b-5
and Section 10(b).20 The district court convicted Chiarella on all counts and
the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.'
Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court, began the analysis with
the language of the statute.20 However, Justice Powell noted that the statu-
tory language did not explicitly address the situation presented .21  The diffi-
culty arose because the statute did not address "whether silence may con-
stitute a manipulative or deceptive device." 212 Lacking any reliable guidance
from legislative history, Justice Powell proceeded to examine precedent
and the common law.214
Justice Powell recognized that the SEC took an important step in Cady,
Roberts when it declared that a corporate insider must disclose material non-
public information or refrain from trading.2 5 According to the Court's inter-
pretation of Cady, Roberts, the relationship that grants access to special non-





208. Id. Section 32(a) authorizes criminal penalties for violations of the Exchange Act.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 32(a), 48 Stat. 881, 904 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994)).
209. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980).
210. See id. at 225-26 (beginning analysis with language of § 10(b)).
211. See id. at 226 (noting that statute did not expressly cover whether silence consti-
tutes violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
212. See id. (stating that § 10(b) fails to mention silence as manipulative or deceptive
device).
213. See id. (noting failure of legislative history to provide assistance in evaluating
silence as manipulative or deceptive device).
214. See id. (using prior case law and common law to answer question whether silence
may be fraud).
215. See id. at 226-27 (recognizing Cady, Roberts decision as important and discussing
disclose or abstain rule).
216. See id. at 227-28 (claiming special relationship created affirmative obligation in
Cady, Roberts). The Court stated that "[i]n its Cady, Roberts decision, the Commission
recognized a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation
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then compared the Cady, Roberts interpretation with the common law and
decided that each comported with the other.2"7 Finding common-law fraud
for nondisclosure required a breach of an affirmative duty to speak.21 8 A
fiduciary relationship or other relationship of trust creates an affirmative
duty to disclose.219 The Court then asserted that, in Cady, Roberts, the SEC
found such a relationship of trust between a company's shareholders and
insiders who possessed material nonpublic information, and that the SEC
subsequently declared that this relationship created an affirmative duty of
disclosure.' Justice Powell briefly discussed federal precedent and con-
cluded that past decisions required a similar finding that a claim of fraudulent
nondisclosure could exist only upon a breach of an affirmative duty to
disclose." Finally, the Court stated that a cognizable claim for Section
10(b) fraudulent nondisclosure required the breach of an affirmative duty
of disclosure arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between the
securities transaction's participants.'
The Court applied this analysis to Chiarella's actions and reversed the
conviction.' Chiarella did not possess an affirmative duty to disclose the
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position
with that corporation. This relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose. ... " Id. at 228.
217. See id. at 227-28 (discussing common-law rule and how special relationship creates
affirmative duty to disclose material information).
218. See id. (evaluating affirmative duty of disclosure at common law). The Court
stated that "one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so." Id. at 228; see also
supra notes 35-63 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent nondisclosure at common
law).
219. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (stating that fiduciary rela-
tionship or other relationship of trust creates obligation to disclose); supra notes 35-63 and
accompanying text (discussing creation of affirmative duty of disclosure at common law).
220. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (asserting that SEC found special relationship
between shareholders and insiders that created duty to disclose).
221. See id. at 229-30 (discussing federal precedent and concluding that party must
possess affirmative duty of disclosure for valid claim of fraudulent nondisclosure to exist).
222. See id. at 230 (stating test for actionable fraudulent nondisclosure claim under
§ 10(b)). The Court delineated the test, and stated that:
[A]dministrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable
under § 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history
specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is pre-
mised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction.
Id. (emphasis added).
223. See id. at 231-35 (reversing Chiarella's conviction).
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tender offer information to the sellers of the securities. ' 4 There was a
complete lack of a fiduciary relationship or other relationship arising from
trust and confidence between Chiarella and the sellers that would have
created an affirmative duty of disclosure.' The Court determined that it
could not affirm Chiarella's conviction without creating a general duty for
all market participants to refrain from trading on material nonpublic
information.' Concluding its discussion, the Court summarized its
important holding that Section 10(b) actions for fraudulent nondisclosure
require a breach of an affirmative duty to disclose created by a fiduciary
relationship or another relationship of trust and confidence. ' 7
In reversing Chiarella's conviction, the Court rejected the Second
Circuit's analysis' for two reasons. 9  First, the Court noted that "not
every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under
[Section] 10(b). '"'  This statement repudiates the second element of
the Cady, Roberts analysis and the policies underlying the equal access
theory in Texas Gulf Sulphur.31 Further, the Court stated that "neither
the Congress nor the Commission has ever adopted a parity-of-informa-
tion rule" 2 and that to do so would impose a general duty on all market
participants to disclose or to abstain 33  The second deficiency in the
Second Circuit's analysis stemmed from the absence of any relationship
between Chiarella and the sellers that required an affirmative duty to
224. See id. at 232 (noting absence of duty to disclose nonpublic information).
225. See id. (finding that Chiarella was not fiduciary, agent, or other person who
obtained trust and confidence of sellers).
226. See id. at 233 (refusing to adopt general duty of disclosure for all market partici-
pants).
227. See id. at 234-35 (summarizing Court's holding). The Court concluded that
"Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.
When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a
duty to speak." Id.
228. See id. at 231-33 (rejecting reasoning of Second Circuit). The Second Circuit, in
affirming the conviction, held that "[a]nyone - corporate insider or not - who regularly
receives material inside information may not use that information to trade in securities with-
out incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." Id. (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588
F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
229. See id. at 232 (stating that Second Circuit's analysis suffered for two reasons).
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 126-59 and accompanying text (discussing Cady, Roberts and
Texas Gulf Sulphur).
232. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
233. See id. (discussing how affirming Second Circuit would require general duty to
disclose).
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disclose." The Court reiterated its finding that Rule 10b-5 fraud occurs only
from a breach of an affirmative duty of disclosure and stated that Chiarella
did not commit fraud because he had no duty to disclose. 5 Because the
Second Circuit based its decision on the equal access theory and principles
of fairness, rather than on a breach of an affirmative duty between securities
transaction parties, the Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction.3 6
Chiarella is an extremely important decision in the development of
insider trading enforcement law under Rule lOb-5. 7 The Supreme Court
repudiated the Second Circuit's equal access theory 8 and established that
a Rule lOb-5 violation cannot occur unless a party to a securities transaction
breaches an affirmative duty to disclose created by a fiduciary relationship
or by another relationship of trust and confidence. 9 After Chiarella, the
development and application of insider trading enforcement has come full
circle, returning to the common-law principle of a securities fraud claim for
nondisclosure based on the breach of an affirmative duty between parties to
a securities transaction.m°
Chiarella is also an important decision because the misappropriation
theory has its genesis in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion."4 The
Government offered the Supreme Court an alternative and original theory -
later named the "misappropriation theory" - that Chiarella violated Rule
lOb-5 when he breached a duty that he owed to his employer and to the
234. See id. at 232 (noting that Chiarella's conviction was incorrect even though no
duty to disclose existed).
235. See id. at 232-33 (stating that Chiarella could not have committed fraud because
he had no relationship with sellers creating affirmative duty to disclose).
236. See id. at 232 (stating that Second Circuit decision "rested solely upon its belief
that the federal securities laws have 'created a system providing equal access to information
necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment'" and then overruling Second Circuit
(quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980))). As a result of the Court's decision in Chiarella, the SEC promulgated Rule
14e-3, which prohibits certain conduct in relation to tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 14e-3
(1995) (prohibiting certain behavior relating to tender offers).
237. See Cuevas, supra note 24, at 804 (describing Chiarella as "landmark decision").
238. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (discussing and rejecting
Second Circuit's parity of information analysis).
239. See id. at 230 (discussing requirement that party breach affirmative duty of
disclosure for actionable Rule lob-5 claim based on fraudulent nondisclosure).
240. See Aldave, supra note 16, at 104 (stating that Court considers fraud under Rule
lob-5 identical to fraud under common law); Phillips & Zutz, supra note 3, at 86 (noting
that insider trading doctrine has come full circle).
241. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (advocating upholding
Chiarella's conviction under Rule lob-5 on theory that he defrauded his employer).
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acquiring company.242 Because the district court did not present this new
theory to the jury, the Court refused to consider whether the theory would
support a conviction.243 However, the Court made a special point to note
that it did not accept, reject, or pass judgment on the merits of this new
theory. 244
Chief Justice Burger did, however, support a conviction of Chiarella
under the Government's alternative theory.245 Chief Justice Burger took an
expansive view of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and stated that a "person
who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to dis-
close that information or to refrain from trading. "2  Regardless of any duty
between the parties to the transaction, Chief Justice Burger found that "these
provisions reach any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme. "247 It is not
clear where this blanket duty originates. Chief Justice Burger based his inter-
pretation of Rule lOb-5 on principles of fairness2' and the assertion that
misappropriated information grants an undue trading advantage serving no
useful purpose.249 Chief Justice Burger did not explain how a breach of a
duty to disclose arising from the source of the information - such as a
breach to an employer - becomes an act of fraud committed between parties
to a securities transaction.' This omission notwithstanding, Chief Justice
242. See id. at 235-37 (discussing alternative theory offered as basis of Chiarella's
conviction). The Government argued that Chiarella:
[B]reached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon information
that he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of a printer employed
by the corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a conviction under
§ 10(b) for fraud perpetrated upon both the acquiring corporation and the sellers.
Id. at 235-36.
243. See id. at 235-37 (refusing to uphold conviction under new theory because jury did
not consider it).
244. See id. at 236-37 (reserving judgment on new theory). The Court stated that it
would "not speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or
whether such a breach constitutes a violation of § 10(b)." Id.
245. See id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing how application of new
theory would support conviction of Chiarella).
246. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
247. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
248. See id. at 241-42 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that purpose of antifraud
provision is to assure fair dealing and citing Cady, Roberts for its two-element analysis
partly based on fairness).
249. See id. at 241 (Burger C.J., dissenting) (stating that undue trading advantage
serves no useful function).
250. See id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (omitting explanation of origin of duty
to disclose between parties to securities trade).
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Burger supported Chiarella's conviction under Rule lOb-5 and stated that
Chiarella "misappropriated - stole, to put it bluntly - valuable nonpublic
information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence"'"z1 and subsequently
traded on that information. 25
E. Dirks v. SEC
In Dirks v. SEC, 53 the Supreme Court considered tippee" 4 liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 5 Raymond L. Dirks specialized in
analyzing and providing information to institutional investors concerning
insurance company securities.' 6 On March 6, 1973, a former employee of
Equity Funding of America (Equity Funding), a large insurance company,
informed Dirks of the company's fraudulent corporate practices.' Dirks
began an investigation of Equity Funding and contacted several members
of senior management and subordinate employees. 58 The senior employees
denied any fraud, but the subordinate employees corroborated the former
employee's allegations.' 9 While performing the investigation, Dirks dis-
cussed the fraud allegations with clients and investors.' Several investors
liquidated their holdings in Equity Funding. 1 During the two-week investi-
gation, the stock price fell from $26 per share to less than $15 per share,
causing the New York Stock Exchange to stop trading in that stock on March
27th California authorities discovered the fraud, and the SEC subse-
quently filed a complaint against Equity Funding.' 3 However, the SEC also
examined Dirks's role in exposing the fraud and, after an administrative
hearing, found that Dirks aided and abetted violations of Section 17(a) of
251. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
252. See id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (supporting conviction of Chiarella for violating
Rule lOb-5).
253. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
254. A tippee is an individual who receives material inside information from another
person, the tipper.
255. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648-68 (1983) (evaluating tippee liability under
Rule lOb-5).
256. Id. at 648.









the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5.?
The SEC posited a theory of tippee liability in which Dirks received and then
repeated inside information about the fraud to investors who subsequently
traded on that information.' Dirks appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which also ruled against him.7
However, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari and reversed
the court of appeals.'
The Court began its analysis by discussing and strongly affirming the
Chiarella holding:" s Only a breach of a duty to disclose arising from a
relationship between parties to a securities transaction violates Rule lOb-5's
prohibition against fraudulent nondisclosure.69 However, the SEC, finding
that Dirks violated Rule lOb-5, had primarily relied on the equal access
theory repudiated in Chiarella.27° The Court found that the SEC had acted
incorrectly by relying on the theory and refused to lend any merit to the
equal access theory. 27' Noting that the SEC had difficulty in applying the
Chiarella analysis to tippees,27 the Court created a test for tippee liability
under Rule 10b-5.273
The Court stated that the "tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is deriva-
tive from that of the insider's duty."274 Therefore, the Court found that a
tippee does not always possess a duty to disclose simply because he receives
inside information from a corporate official. 75 However, there are some
instances when a tippee acquires a duty to disclose or to abstain.276 Under
such circumstances, the first inquiry is whether the insider has breached his
fiduciary duty to the corporation in passing the information to the tippee and
264. Id. at 650-51.
265. Id. at 651.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 653-58 (discussing and affirming Chiarella holding).
269. See id. (restating Chiarella holding).
270. See id. at 655-57 (stating that SEC followed discredited equal access or parity of
information theory rejected in Chiarella).
271. See id. (refusing to follow SEC interpretation).
272. See id. at 655 (noting that SEC had difficulty applying Chiarella relationship re-
quirement to tippee liability).
273. See id. at 659-64 (creating test for tippee liability under Rule 10b-5).
274. Id. at 659.
275. See id. at 658-59 (stating that information passed to tippee does not always pass
derivative duty to disclose or to abstain).
276. See id. at 659 (deciding that some instances trigger duty of disclosure for tippee).
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whether the tippee knew of the breach.' 7 A tippee will possess "a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic
information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows
or should know there has been a breach."278 The next inquiry analyzes what
behavior by the tipper demonstrates a breach of the tipper's fiduciary duty.'
The Court found that a tipper breaches his fiduciary duty when he personally
benefits from the disclosure to the tippee.? Many events, however, might
result in personal gain to the tipper, including pecuniary gains, advancements
to personal reputation, or making an informational gift to a friend or to a
relative.21
The Court applied this new test to Dirks and found that none of the
Equity Funding insiders violated their fiduciary duty by advancing information
about the fraud to Dirks.' The employees received no personal benefit,
either monetary or to their reputation, by divulging the information to Dirks.3
Quite the contrary, the tippers were motivated solely to expose the fraud.'
The Court held that Dirks could not have violated a derivative fiduciary duty
because the insiders did not violate their own fiduciary duty, and therefore,
Dirks owed no duty to abstain from the use of the information.'
F. Summary
As a result of a decade of decisions that concluded with Dirks, the Court
had severely restricted the application of Rule 10b-5.2 6 The Court, using a
277. See id. at 660 (stating that tippees have duty of disclosure when tippers violate
fiduciary duty and tippees are aware of breach).
278. Id.
279. See id. at 662-64 (discussing events that denote breach of fiduciary duty).
280. See id. at 662 (stating that tipper breaches fiduciary duty when tipper receives per-
sonal gain). The Court stated that the "test is whether the insider personally will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative
breach." Id.
281. See id. at 663-64 (discussing events that might result in tippee's personal gain).
282. See id. at 666-67 (analyzing reason why Dirks did not violate Rule lOb-5).
283. See id. at 667 (noting that insiders did not receive any benefit from discussing
inside information with Dirks).
284. See id. (stating exposure of fraud as reason for tipper disclosure).
285. See id. (concluding that Dirks did not violate Rule lOb-5). The Court stated that
"[fln the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative
breach by Dirks." Id.
286. See Cuevas, supra note 24, at 807 (stating that Court substantially narrowed appli-
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strict statutory analysis, completely rejected the Second Circuit's parity of
information or equal access theory, and strongly asserted that a Rule lOb-5
violation for nondisclosure could only occur when there was a breach of a
fiduciary duty between parties to a securities transaction.' w The important
focus for a Rule lOb-5 action was neither the nature nor the type of informa-
tion used, but the participant's conduct in using the information. 8 However,
the SEC and the Second Circuit, though bruised, were not defeated. In the
early 1980s, both the SEC and the Second Circuit latched onto Chief Justice
Burger's Chiarella dissent and created a new theory of liability under Rule
lOb-5: the misappropriation theory. 2 9
VT The Development of the Misappropriation Theory
As a reaction to the Supreme Court's restriction of Rule lOb-5 application
and in response to gaps thereby created, the SEC and the Second Circuit
developed and applied the misappropriation theory to certain Rule lOb-5
actions not covered by classical insider trading enforcement.29° The misappro-
priation theory differs from classical insider trading in that the requisite fraud
does not occur between the parties to the securities transaction, but between
the violator and the source of the information.291 A person may violate Rule
lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory even though she owes no duty to the
opposite party in the securities transaction. 2' The fraud occurs when the
violator improperly obtains the material inside information in breach of a fidu-
ciary relationship or another relationship of trust and confidence. 2' This fraud
cation of Rule lOb-5 and § 10(b)).
287. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1194 (noting that Court rejected equal access or
parity of information theory and that liability under Rule lb-5 now requires breach of duty
to disclose).
288. See Mitchell, supra note 131, at 778 (stating that Chiarella is epitome of conduct
approach under Rule lOb-5); Phillips & Zutz, supra note 3, at 86 (claiming that insider
trading law monitors conduct, not informational equality).
289. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1196 (claiming that misappropriation theory de-
veloped from Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella); infra notes 290-453 (discussing
development of misappropriation theory).
290. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 20, at 160-61 (stating that misappropriation theory
developed to fill gaps in insider trading enforcement created by Chiarella).
291. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(stating that under misappropriation theory, fraud may occur between violator and source
of information), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
292. See id. (noting that "the misappropriation theory does not require that the buyer
or seller of securities be defrauded").
293. See id. (finding fraud under misappropriation theory when violator breaches fidu-
ciary duty or some other relationship of trust and confidence); LANGEVOORT, supra note 20,
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is then transferred onto the securities transaction, thereby satisfying the
requirements of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. 21 Under the misappropriation
theory, the victim of the fraud usually does not suffer any pecuniary loss,
and the person with the monetary loss - the party trading opposite the vio-
lator - is not the victim of the fraud.2" In this sense, the misappropriation
theory is a hybrid that, by combining the victim of the fraud with the actual
securities transaction, allows a finding of a Rule 10b-5 violation. The
following discussion of Second Circuit cases explains the development of
the theory and its application.
A. Early Development
In United States v. Newman,296 decided after Chiarella and before Dirks,
the Second Circuit applied the misappropriation theory mentioned in Chia-
rella.297 James M. Newman worked in the over-the-counter department of
a New York brokerage firm.298 Between 1973 and 1978, Newman received
confidential information concerning corporate takeovers from employees of
Morgan Stanley & Co. (Morgan Stanley) and Kuhn Loeb & Co. (Kuhn
Loeb), two investment banking firms.2' The employees misappropriated
their employer's confidential information regarding the takeovers. 300 New-
man purchased shares of target corporations prior to public disclosure and
subsequently sold the stock for a large profit after the public announce-
ment.30 ' Newman shared the proceeds with the Morgan Stanley and Kuhn
Loeb employees .3t  The United States indicted Newman and his co-con-
spirators, charging violations of Rule 10b-5, Section 10(b), mail fraud, and
conspiracy to commit securities and mail fraud. 303 The United States District
at 159 (stating that victim of fraud is person who entrusted information to fiduciary).
294. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 200 (noting that misappropriation theory satisfies re-
quirement of Rule lob-5 that "any person" suffer fraud).
295. See Bayne, supra note 14, at 144-47 (discussing elements of misappropriation
theory and noting that focus is on taking of information, not on traders with monetary loss
who are not victims of fraud).
296. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
297. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 14-19 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying
misappropriation theory for first time), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).





303. Id. at 14.
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Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all of the allega-
tions.3
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
reinstated the indictment.3" The court decided that the case could proceed
even though the victims of the fraud - the investment firms - did not
participate in a trade with Newman. 6 The court of appeals reasoned that
such concerns were relevant only in civil actions - because determining the
victim of the fraud is a standing question - and stated that a Rule lOb-5
criminal action does not require an actual purchaser or seller to be the victim
of the fraud.3" The Second Circuit noted that Rule lOb-5 "contains no
specific requirement that fraud be perpetrated upon the seller or buyer of
securities. "3 08
The court then addressed the actual fraud committed by Newman. 3°9
Declaring that "we need spend little time on the issue of fraud and deceit, "310
the court found the employees' misappropriation of information for personal
gain in breach of their fiduciary duty to be fraudulent. 1 The only basis for
the finding of fraud was the theft of inside information in breach of an
employer/employee relationship." 2 The appellate court determined that "[b]y
sullying the reputations of [the investment banks] as safe repositories of client
confidences, appellee and his cohorts defrauded those employers as surely
as if they took their money.""'
After the Second Circuit found the requisite fraud, it still needed to find
a connection between the fraud and the securities transaction. 4 Examining
the behavior of Newman, the court determined that profiting from the quick
sale of securities purchased on misappropriated information satisfied the "in
304. Id.
305. Id. at 16.
306. See id. at 16-17 (stating that criminal action could proceed despite fact that
defrauded party did not trade with defendant).
307. See id. at 17 (claiming that victim of fraud need not be purchaser or seller for
criminal violation of Rule 10b-5 to occur).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 17-18.
310. Id.
311. See id. (stating that using insider information for personal gain was fraudulent).
312. See id. at 17 (comparing employees' actions as similar to stealing cash or securities
and stating that such behavior formed basis for fraud).
313. Id.
314. Rule lOb-5 requires that the fraud be "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995); see supra note 5 (providing text of Rule 10b-
5).
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connection" requirement." 5 The fraud need only "touch" the securities sale
to satisfy the in connection requirement. 16 This nexus is a very tenuous rela-
tionship.317 Finding that Newman committed fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of
the indictment."'
Although it did not explicitly name the theory, the Second Circuit
established the misappropriation theory when it found that Newman violated
Rule 10b-5 by perpetrating a fraud on the source of the information - the
investment banks - and then traded on that information. 9 The traders
opposite Newman were not the victims of a fraudulent act, and no fraud
occurred in the actual securities transaction, yet the Second Circuit still found
securities fraud.' This result and the Newman opinion are problematic for
several reasons: First, the Second Circuit simply disregarded Supreme Court
precedent when it transformed the purchaser or seller requirement into a
standing question for civil suits and concluded that the purchaser or seller
requirement had no application in criminal actions.32 By eliminating the
purchaser or seller requirement, the Second Circuit dramatically expanded
Rule 10b-5's applicability."z Second, the court offered only a very brief
analysis of the actionable fraud. The court of appeals found the theft of
inside information in breach of a fiduciary duty to be fraudulent. 3 The
potential damage to the investment banks from the theft included the sullying
315. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding little merit
in Newman's argument that his behavior did not have connection with securities transac-
tion), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
316. See id. (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1972), as precedent for flexible interpretation of "in connection" requirement that included
behavior merely touching transaction).
317. See id. (stating that commentators have called this relationship "very tenuous
indeed" (quoting 1 A. BRoMBaaG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD, § 4.7(574)(3), at 88.34 (1979))).
318. Id. at 19.
319. See id. at 17-19 (finding that Newman violated Rule lob-5 by defrauding source
of information, not opposite party to transaction).
320. See id. (stating that investment banks, not trading partners, were victims of fraud
but still finding Rule lob-5 violation).
321. See Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 162, at 187-88 (stating that Second Circuit
ignored Court's precedent and incorrectly assumed that purchaser or seller requirement is
relevant only in civil action).
322. See id. at 188 (claiming that Second Circuit greatly expanded coverage of Rule
lOb-5).
323. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding fraud
in theft of information), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
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of the banks' reputation. 324 Additionally, the court cited "other areas of the
law, [in which] deceitful misappropriation of confidential information by a
fiduciary, whether described as theft, conversion, or breach of trust, has
been held to be unlawful." 3  "Unlawful" perhaps, but where is the fraud?
The appellate court never explains how theft - not necessarily a fraudulent
activity - or how a simple breach of a fiduciary relationship without decep-
tion transforms the inside employees' behavior into a fraudulent activity.32
Such an expansive and vague view of Rule 10b-5's fraud requirement runs
counter to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rule.327 Finally, the
Second Circuit's liberal interpretation of the in connection requirement fails
to provide clear guidelines. 32 The court's decision that fraud need not occur
between parties to the transaction expanded the Rule's application and did
not comport with Supreme Court precedent.3 29
In SEC v. Materia,3 0 the Second Circuit reaffirmed the misappropriation
theory for enforcement of Rule 10b-5.33 1 The court evaluated Materia's
324. See id. at 17 (asserting loss of reputation as basis for investment bank's dam-
ages).
325. Id. at 18.
326. See id. at 17-18 (omitting detailed analysis of fraudulent behavior).
327. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (delineating specific requirements
for fraud under Rule lOb-5 in tipper/tippee context); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 230 (1980) (stating express requirements for Rule lob-5 action premised on fraudu-
lent nondisclosure); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977) (stating that
mere breach of fiduciary duty is not sufficient to support Rule lob-5 action; instead,
manipulation or deception must be involved).
328. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that fraud
need only "touch" securities transaction), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
329. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-35 (stating that Rule lob-5 action for nondisclo-
sure requires breach of fiduciary relationship between parties to securities transaction); see
also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (requiring that
purchaser or seller be subject to fraud for private right of action under Rule lOb-5).
330. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
331. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 198-203 (2d Cir. 1984) (reaffirming
misappropriation theory), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). In Materia, the Second
Circuit considered the application of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to an employee of a financial
printer. Id. Materia worked for Bowne, Inc. (Bowne), a printing firm specializing in
financial documents, especially tender offers. Id. at 199. Materia read financial docu-
ments aloud to a proofreader who compared the information to the correct copy received
from the client. Id. Blanks were normally used in place of the sensitive information, but
Materia ascertained the target and acquiring companies. Id. Using this information,
Materia purchased stock in four, separate target companies prior to public disclosure and
sold the shares after the public announcement for a profit of over $99,000. Id. The SEC
filed an enforcement action against Materia, claiming violations of Rule lOb-5, § 10(b),
and other securities violations. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern
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actions under Rule 10b-5 using a three-part inquiry.3 32 First, the court found
that Materia's misappropriation of inside information from his employer
constituted fraud:333 "Materia's theft of information was indeed as fraudulent
as if he had converted corporate funds for his personal benefit." 3  Second,
the appellate court repeated that the proper question in a non-civil action is
the scope of the Rule, and not an analysis of to whom the particular duty
is owed.335 Because the Newman court concluded that the victim of the fraud
need not be a purchaser or seller, it was not important that Materia owed
no duty to the other parties to the securities transactions .336 Third, the court
found that Materia's fraud easily satisfied the in connection portion of the
analysis.33 ' Because Materia took the information for the purpose of trading
on it for instant gain, the court of appeals concluded that the fraud perpe-
trated on the employer satisfied the in connection requirement. 338 Therefore,
the Second Circuit determined that Materia violated Rule lOb-5 and re-
affirmed the misappropriation theory.339
B. Expansion of the Misappropriation Theory
In United States v. Carpenter,' the Second Circuit dramatically ex-
panded the application of the misappropriation theory to include a breach
of confidentiality outside securities-related transactions or even a securities-
District of New York found that Materia violated Rule 10b-5. Id. at 200. The district
court determined that Materia breached a fiduciary duty to his employer and the em-
ployer's clients by trading on nonpublic information stolen from his employer. Id. On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the conclusions of the district court. Id. at 203-04.
The court applied the misappropriation theory developed in Newman. Id. at 200-04.
Finding that Materia breached a duty owed to his employer and to its clients, the court
determined that the fraud satisfied the in connection requirement of Rule 10b-5. Id.
Therefore, the court held that Materia violated Rule 10b-5. Id. at 203-04.
332. See id. at 201-04 (ipplying three-part inquiry).
333. See id. at 201-02 (finding Materia's behavior fraudulent).
334. Id.
335. See id. at 202-03 (stating that fraud need not be perpetrated on purchaser or
seller).
336. See id. (stating that requirement that purchaser or seller be victim of fraud is im-
portant only for civil actions).
337. See id. at 203 (finding in connection inquiry satisfied).
338. See id. (evaluating fraud committed on employer in larger context of making
instant profits and concluding that profit motivations satisfied in connection requirement).
339. See id. (concluding that Materia violated Rule lOb-5 under misappropriation
theory).
340. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
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related institution."4 R. Foster Winans wrote the influential Heard on the
Street column (Heard column) for the Wall Street Journal (Journal).'42 Co-
conspirator David Carpenter, a news clerk, also worked at the Journal.43
Winans and Carpenter participated in a scheme with Kenneth P. Felis and
Peter Brant, both stockbrokers, to trade on Heard column information prior
to the column's publication.' Usually the day before publication, Winans
and Carpenter would supply the two stockbrokers with the Heard column
information, and the stockbrokers would execute trades based on the infor-
mation.345 This process occurred on twenty-seven different occasions, netting
profits near $690,000.' Winans and Carpenter delivered this information
despite Journal policy deeming all news material created by employees
Journal property and all nonpublic information as confidential.347 After an
SEC investigation, Brant became the Government's key witness, and the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted
Felis and Winans of Rule 10b-5 violations, Section 10(b) violations, mail
fraud, wire fraud, and several conspiracy counts.' The district court also
convicted Carpenter of aiding and abetting in the commission of securities
fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. 49
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed all securities fraud convictions
under the misappropriation theory.35 Finding the securities fraud issue one
of first impression,35 the court inquired whether Winans's breach of his duty
of confidentiality would support a securities fraud conviction. 52 The court
341. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1027-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (expanding
misappropriation theory), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
342. Id. at 1026.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1026-27.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1027.
347. Id. at 1026.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See id. at 1027-34 (convicting defendants under misappropriation theory).
351. Id. at 1027.
352. See id. at 1027-28 (noting primary issue on appeal). The court stated that:
This case requires us to decide whether . . . [the defendants] violated or con-
spired to violate or aided and abetted in the violation of federal securities laws
by misappropriating material, nonpublic information in the form of the timing
and content of the Wall Street Journal's confidential schedule of columns of
acknowledged influence in the securities market, in contravention of the estab-
lished policy of the newspaper, for their own profit. ...
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determined that Winans breached a duty of confidentiality owed to the
Journal when he used information concerning the Heard column's timing
and content. 3  The important question was whether Winans's breach of
confidentiality could support a Rule lOb-5 action. 4 The court concluded
that, under the misappropriation theory, the facts would support a conviction
under Rule lOb-5:355 "The misappropriation theory... broadly proscribes
the conversion by 'insiders' or others of material non-public information in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities."356 Accordingly, the court
of appeals found that Winans converted the Heard column information for
his own use and that this conversion satisfied the "fraud or deceit" require-
ment of the antifraud provisions. 357 After the fraud finding, the Second
Circuit noted that it was immaterial that the victim of the fraud was not a
party to the transaction. 8 The court summarily asserted that "[i]t is suffi-
cient that the fraud was committed upon Winans'[s] employer. "'I Finally,
the court experienced no difficulty satisfying the in connection
requirement .3  Finding that the securities transactions supplied the only
purpose for misappropriating the information, the court concluded that the
scheme satisfied the in connection requirement of Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. 361 Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed the securities convictions
of all defendants under the misappropriation theory z.3 1
Id. at 1027.
353. See id. at 1028 (determining that Winans breached duty of confidentiality to
Journal when he used material nonpublic information about Heard column).
354. See id. (reducing case to whether breach of confidentiality could support securities
fraud allegation). The court stated that "we address specifically whether an employee's use
of such information in breach of a duty of confidentiality to an employer serves as an ade-
quate predicate for a securities violation." Id. at 1031.
355. See id. at 1028-34 (stating that breach of duty of confidentiality would support
Rule 10b-5 action).
356. Id. at 1029.
357. See id. at 1031 (finding that Winans's behavior amounted to "fraud and deceit"
under antifraud provisions). The court stated that "Winans 'misappropriated - stole, to put
it bluntly - valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence.'"
Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing)).
358. See id. at 1032 (evaluating relevancy of victim of fraud to misappropriation theory
and concluding that victim need not be purchaser or seller).
359. Id.
360. See id. at 1032-33 (satisfying in connection requirement).
361. See id. (finding that scheme of misappropriating information for purpose of trading
on it satisfied in connection requirement).
362. See id. at 1034 (affirming convictions). The court stated that:
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The defendants appealed the Second Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court. 3  In its decision, the Court was divided four to four on the validity
and application of the misappropriation theory.A Justice White, who wrote
the Court's opinion, included no substantive comment and simply stated that
"[t]he Court is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the
securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those
counts. "316
In Carpenter, the Second Circuit determined that Winans violated Rule
lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory because he breached an employment
duty of confidentiality, even though the transactions did not involve Journal
stock and the Journal did not participate in the securities transactions."
This conclusion greatly expanded the application of the misappropriation
theory and is disturbing for several reasons. First, the court based its finding
of a Rule 10b-5 violation on the breach of a duty owed to an employer, not
to a market participant nor to a corporation whose shares were traded.367
This position dramatically departs from Newman and Materia. In Newman,
the stockbrokers breached a duty to their employers, but the inside informa-
tion came from the same corporate clients whose shares Newman subse-
quently purchased. Therefore, the court reasoned that the brokers also
wronged the investment banks' clients.36 9 Similarly, in Materia, the defen-
[B]ecause of his duty of confidentiality to the Journal, defendant Winans - and
Felis and Carpenter, who knowingly participated with him - had a corollary
duty, which they breached, under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, to abstain from
trading in securities on the basis of misappropriated information or to do so only
upon making adequate disclosure to those with whom they traded.
Id.
363. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
364. See id. at 24 (stating that securities fraud question evenly split Court). Only eight
members of the Court heard Carpenter because of Justice Kennedy's confirmation process.
365. Id.
366. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1025, 1027-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding
defendants violated Rule lOb-5 under misappropriation theory notwithstanding facts that
Journal did not participate in transactions and that defendants did not trade in Journal
stock), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
367. See id. at 1031 (finding fraud in breach of employer-created duty of confidential-
ity).
368. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that brokers
obtained information concerning mergers from employers who received it from clients),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
369. See id. at 17 (stating that defendants harmed clients of investment banks). The
court stated that "[a]ppellee and his cohorts also wronged Morgan Stanley's and Kuhn
Loeb's clients . . . ." Id.
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dant misappropriated tender offer information from Bowne, the defendant's
employer, but Bowne had received the inside information from its clients.37
Both Newman and Materia misappropriated information given to their
employers by clients and then traded in the clients' stock.37' The situations
presented in Newman and Materia significantly differ from the scenario
presented in Carpenter. In Carpenter, the information taken from the
Journal was neither derived from nor had any relation to the inside workings
of the corporations whose shares the defendants purchased or sold.3"
Interestingly, Winans wrote most of the Heard columns and analyzed data
freely available to the public.3' Winans did not even take any substantive
information - he could not, because he created it - he took only the
Journal's publication schedule.374 Surprisingly, the Second Circuit based
a securities fraud conviction on the defendant's use of a nonmarket partic-
ipant's publication schedule regarding information that the defendant actually
compiled from public information.375 This result contradicts the Supreme
Court's finding in Santa Fe.376 In Santa Fe, the Court refused to find a Rule
lOb-5 violation for a mere breach of fiduciary duty without some affirmative
manipulation or deception. 3v Clearly, the Rule does not support all breaches
370. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that Materia
misappropriated tender offer information from financial documents of Bowne's clients),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
371. See id. at 201-03 (finding that Materia took information entrusted to employers
from client and then traded in client's shares); Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-18 (determining
that brokers misappropriated information and then traded in shares of investment bank's
clients).
372. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that
misappropriated information only included information about timing and content of
articles, not information obtained from other corporations), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The court noted that "[tihe information misappropriated here
was the Journal's own confidential schedule of forthcoming publications. It was the
advance knowledge of the timing and content of these publications" that the defendants
used to trade. Id.
373. See id. at 1037 (Miner, J., concurring) (stating that Winans compiled information
and wrote Heard column).
374. See id. (Miner, J., concurring) (noting that Winans only took publication sched-
ule).
375. See id. at 1027-34 (finding defendants violated Rule 10b-5).
376. See supra notes 187-99 and accompanying text (discussing Santa Fe).
377. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-76 (1977) (determining that
Rule lob-5 requires deception or manipulation and that mere breach of fiduciary duty is
insufficient). The Court stated that "the cases do not support the proposition... that a
breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrepresenta-
tion, or nondisclosure, violates the statute and the Rule." Id. at 476.
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of a fiduciary obligation. 8 A Section 10(b) violation requires deception and
does "not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than corpo-
rate mismanagement."379 The Court did not wish to develop and to apply
a "federal fiduciary standard" in Rule lOb-5 cases3" because the Rule does
not "cover the corporate universe."381 Winans's behavior, however, closely
resembles the situation that the Supreme Court chose not to regulate using
Rule lOb-5 in Santa Fe.3n Winans breached a fiduciary duty of confidential-
ity without any manipulation or deception because his position granted him
access to the Heard column's content and to the publishing schedule."u The
Second Circuit directly conflicted with the holding of Santa Fe when it used
Rule lOb-5 to convict Winans.
38
The Carpenter holding also conflicts with the Supreme Court's Chiarella
decision.31 In Chiarella, the Court determined that a Rule lOb-5 violation
predicated on nondisclosure is valid only when there is an affirmative duty
to disclose arising from a fiduciary duty or another relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties to the transaction.38 6 The Carpenter court
contradicted the Chiarella holding when it determined that the defendants'
duty of disclosure was derived from the breach of a duty of confidentiality
378. See id. (stating that all breaches of fiduciary obligation are not supported by
Rule). The Court found that using fraud within "Rule 10b-5 to bring within the ambit of
the Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction...
would . . . 'add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning.'" Id. at 472 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
379. Id. at 479 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971)).
380. See id. at 477-80 (discussing reluctance to federalize fiduciary standard).
381. Id. at 480 (quoting William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,700 (1974)).
382. Compare Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-81 (1977) (refusing to
apply Rule 10b-5 to mere breach of fiduciary duty) with United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that Winans breached employer-created
fiduciary duty of confidentiality), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
383. See id. at 1028 (stating that Winans learned Heard column content and schedule
in course of employment, but not mentioning any manipulation or deception).
384. Compare Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 472-81 (holding that mere fiduciary
breach without deception or manipulation is insufficient to find Rule 10b-5 violation) with
Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031-32 (finding that Winans committed fraud under Rule 10b-5
by breaching fiduciary duty of confidentiality owed to Journal).
385. See supra notes 200-52 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella).
386. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-30 (1980) (requiring affirma-
tive duty to disclose arising from relationship of trust and confidence between parties to
transaction).
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and not from any fiduciary duty or another relationship of trust and confi-
dence with the opposite party to the securities transaction.3" The idea that
a prior breach of a duty of confidentiality to an outside party creates a
corollary duty of disclosure does not comport with Chiarella's conclusion
that the affirmative duty to disclose is derived from the relationship between
the parties to the transaction. 8 Winans and his co-defendants did not have
a fiduciary relationship or another relationship of trust and confidence with
the opposite parties to the transactions, and therefore, they should not have
possessed an affirmative obligation to disclose.
The Carpenter decision is also problematic for what it does not properly
address. According to the Second Circuit's reasoning, if the Journal did
not have a confidentiality requirement or if the Journal had freely encour-
aged its employees to trade on Heard column information, then securities
fraud would not have occurred.389 Because the gravamen of the Rule lOb-5
violation in Carpenter was the breach of a duty of confidentiality, no breach
should mean no Rule lOb-5 violation. Similarly, if the Journal itself had
traded on the Heard column information, there would have been no breach
of confidentiality - and presumably, no Rule lOb-5 violation - because
it is absurd to say that the newspaper owed a duty to itself.3" Although the
Carpenter defendants presented this argument to the court, the court of
appeals rejected it, stated that it was unlikely that the Journal would ruin
its own reputation, and again asserted that even if the Journal could trade
lawfully,39" ' the defendants could not trade lawfully because of their duty of
confidentiality.39 Strangely, if the Journal traded or if the employees could
387. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that
Winans had duty to disclose or to abstain created by breach of duty of confidentiality), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The court stated that "because of his duty
of confidentiality to the Journal ... [the defendants] ... had a corollary duty, which they
breached under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, to abstain from trading in securities on the
basis of the misappropriated information or to do so only upon making adequate disclosure
to those with whom they traded." Id.
388. Compare Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034 (stating that duty to disclose is derived from
prior breach of confidentiality) with Chiarella, 444 U.S. at 228-30 (holding that duty to
disclose arises only from relationship between parties to securities transaction).
389. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1027-34 (basing Rule lOb-5 violation on breach of
confidentiality owed to Journal).
390. See id. at 1033 (stating that Journal possibly could trade legally on Heard column
information).
391. The Second Circuit reserved judgment on whether the Journal could trade lawfully
on the information in the Heard column. Id. at 1033 n.10.
392. See id. at 1033-34 (rejecting defendants' argument that it was improper to hold
defendants liable for something their employer could legally do).
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trade without breaching a duty, the investors would still have had the same
loss whether or not it amounted to a Rule 10b-5 violation. Both problems
are inadequately answered in Carpenter and exist because the Second Circuit,
by using the misappropriation theory, shifted the focus of the securities fraud
provisions away from the securities transaction to some antecedent duty
between the violator and the source of the information.3 Supreme Court
precedent demonstrates that the purpose of the securities laws is to protect
investors.3" By applying the misappropriation theory, the Second Circuit
protected corporations - not investors - when it found a breach of duty
in violation of trust and confidence. Yet, as evidenced by the possible
situations above, investors still may suffer the same loss. By using the mis-
appropriation theory of Rule lOb-5, the Second Circuit attempted to apply
the federal fiduciary standard rejected in Santa Fe.39
Not only does the misappropriation theory, as applied in Carpenter,
contradict Supreme Court precedent, it also fails to provide guidelines for
prospective enforcement. Both the Chiarella and Dirks decisions provided
clear procedures for analyzing an alleged Rule lOb-5 violation.396 Because
the misappropriation theory is not based on the relationship between the
parties to a securities transaction, but instead on the relationship from which
a person derives the information, it is not clear what types of relationships
will support a Rule lOb-5 conviction under the misappropriation theory.
This confusion creates enforcement difficulties and leaves traders at the whim
393. See id. at 1031 (finding requisite fraud in employees' breach of confidentiality);
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding requisite fraud when Materia
took information entrusted to him in course of employment), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding requisite fraud
when brokers took information from their employers), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
394. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (discussing how duty to disclose
arises from relationship between parties to securities transaction and not simply from posses-
sion of material nonpublic information); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-30
(1980) (stating that duty to disclose arises from relationship between members of securities
transaction); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977) (noting that Rule lOb-5
neither supplies federal fiduciary standard nor protects against simple corporate mismanage-
ment); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976) (finding that purpose of
federal securities regulations is to protect investors); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (allowing only actual purchasers or sellers to bring
private Rule lob-5 action).
395. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977) (stating that Rule
lob-5 should not be used to apply federal fiduciary standard).
396. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (predicating tippee liability on breach
of fiduciary duty between tipper and shareholders); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 230 (1980) (stating that affirmative duty to disclose stems from relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to securities trade).
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of the SEC - a dangerous situation that does not sufficiently warn investors
that their behavior may be criminal.3"
In United States v. Chesman,398 the Second Circuit again evaluated the
misappropriation theory, but this time the alleged breach occurred in the con-
text of the trust relationship between husband and wife." On November 21,
1986, Ira Waldbaum, president and controlling shareholder of Waldbaum,
Inc., a large, publicly traded supermarket chain, agreed to sell the company
to Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company.' Ira informed certain members
of his family - including his sister, Shirley Watkin - about the sale and
admonished them to remain silent."' Shirley Watkin, however, told her
daughter, Susan Loeb, about the transaction and asked Susan to refrain from
discussing the sale with anyone except her husband, Keith Loeb.' On
November 24th, Susan informed Keith about the sale of the company and
explicitly told him to remain silent. 3 On the next day, November 25th,
Keith called his stockbroker, Robert Chestman, and conveyed the tender
offer information to Chestman. 4 Chestman purchased three thousand Wald-
baum shares at $24.65 per share for his personal account and eight thousand
shares at approximately $26.00 per share for client discretionary accounts.'
After again speaking with Chestman on the 25th, Loeb also purchased one
thousand Waldbaum shares for himself.' On the evening of November
26th, the public announcement of the tender offer for Waldbaum occurred.'t
Waldbaum stock closed at $49 per share the next business day. 8
397. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 n.24 (noting that reliance on SEC discretion is
potentially dangerous). Justice Powell stated that "[w]ithout legal limitations, market
participants are forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that
can be hazardous .... " Id.
398. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
399. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
breach of family relationship supplied basis for misappropriation theory), cert. denied, 503
U.S. .1004 (1992).




404. Id. Surprisingly, Chestman denied ever having spoken with Keith Loeb about
Waldbaum shares on November 25th and stated that he purchased the shares using informa-







After an SEC investigation, Loeb agreed to assist the Government,
disgorge his $25,000 profit, and pay a $25,000 fine.' A grand jury in-
dicted Chestman on ten counts of violating Rule 14e-3(a) (addressing tender
offers), ten counts of violating Rule 10b-5, ten counts of mail fraud, and
one count of perjury.410 A jury convicted Chestman on all counts.41 Chest-
man appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed the convictions.412 The court
of appeals voted to rehear the case en bane for all convictions except the
perjury conviction.4 3
On rehearing, the Second Circuit reinstated the Rule 14e-3 convictions,
but dismissed the Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud convictions.414 Because the
district court had found that Chestman both aided and abetted Loeb and
received a tip from him, the misappropriation theory formed the basis of
the original Rule l0b-5 convictions.41 5 The court of appeals concluded that,
although Chestman was the defendant, Keith Loeb performed the actual
misappropriation. 416 Therefore, the relevant inquiry for determining whether
the defendants violated Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory
involved examining Keith and Susan Loeb's relationship and deciding if any
breach of duty had occurred.417
The Second Circuit began with a discussion of the two predominant
theories of Rule 10b-5 enforcement: the traditional theory and the misappro-
priation theory.41 ' Finding that the traditional theory developed mainly from
Chiarella, the court stated that the traditional theory contrasts with the
misappropriation theory because the buyer or seller need not suffer any fraud
under the misappropriation theory.419 The court noted that, under the mis-
appropriation theory, "a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates
material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar rela-
tionship of trust and confidence and uses that information in a securities






415. See id. at 564 (stating that aiding, abetting, and tippee liability formed basis of
misappropriation theory under Rule lOb-5).
416. See id. (concluding that Keith Loeb's actions, not Chestman's behavior, amounted
to alleged misappropriation).
417. See id. (determining that Keith and Susan Loeb's relationship was proper relation-
ship for study to determine if there was Rule lOb-5 violation).
418. Id. at 565-66.
419. See id. (analyzing classic and misappropriation theories and noting differences).
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transaction. ' 4" The appellate court then examined fiduciary duty con-
cepts and other relationships of trust and confidence to determine wheth-
er Keith Loeb violated such a duty when he used the tender offer informa-
tion.42'
The Second Circuit stated that, after the extremely broad Carpenter
holding, "the fiduciary relationship question takes on special importance."'
The Carpenter decision presented problems because the misappropriation
theory scrutinizes not only fiduciary breaches between shareholders and
corporate officials but also fiduciary breaches of any sort. 423 The court ex-
pressed concern over the Carpenter holding because fiduciary relationships
outside of the shareholder/fiduciary context lack clear definition.4' Existing
precedent also failed to provide clear guidelines for determining the existence
of a fiduciary duty, a particularly disturbing absence given the broad holding
in Carpenter.'2  Therefore, the Second Circuit noted that "we tread cau-
tiously in extending the misappropriation theory to new relationships, lest
our efforts to construe Rule lOb-5 lose method and predictability, taking over
the 'whole corporate universe. 426
The court then attempted to define both the scope of a fiduciary relation-
ship and a relationship of trust and confidence.4' Initially, the court of
appeals eliminated two situations that do not automatically establish a fiduci-
ary relationship: the unilateral entrusting of information and the bond of
marriage alone.4' Receipt of confidential information, without more, does
420. Id. at 566.
421. See id. at 566-71 (analyzing scope and characteristics of fiduciary duties).
422. Id. at 567.
423. See id. (stating that examining fiduciary duty under misappropriation theory is
important because Carpenter holding is very broad). The court stated that the "fraud-on-the-
source theory of liability extends the focus of Rule lOb-5 beyond the sphere of fiduciary/
shareholder relations to fiduciary breaches of any sort, a particularly broad expansion of
lob-5 liability if the add-on, a 'similar relationship of trust and confidence,' is construed
liberally." Id.
424. See id. (noting ease of determining fiduciary duty in shareholder/corporate official
context and difficulty in determining fiduciary duties in other situations). The court noted
that in relationships other than shareholder relationships, "[t]he existence of fiduciary duties
• . . is anything but clear." Id.
425. See id. (finding no precedent of value because prior misappropriation cases oc-
curred in context of employer/employee relationships).
426. Id. (citations omitted).
427. See id. at 567-70 (attempting to define application of fiduciary relationship or other
relationship of trust and confidence in context of misappropriation theory).




not create a fiduciary duty of confidentiality.429 Similarly, a spousal rela-
tionship does not create a fiduciary obligation when one spouse simply makes
a disclosure of confidential information.43 The Second Circuit, however,
listed relationships that are fiduciary in nature, including "attorney and client,
executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and trust
beneficiary, and senior corporate official and shareholder."43' Finding that
neither the relationship between Keith and Susan Loeb nor the relationship
between Keith and Susan's family possessed characteristics similar to these
relationships, the court concluded that Keith did not stand in a fiduciary
relationship with either Susan or Susan's family.432
However, the Second Circuit continued its inquiry because the mis-
appropriation theory also requires an examination of "whether there exists
a 'similar relationship of trust and confidence.'""' The court determined
that a similar relationship of trust and confidence is the essential equivalent
of a fiduciary relationship.4' The Second Circuit discussed characteristics
that make a relationship fiduciary in nature: discretionary authority, reliance,
custodial possession of property, a prohibition on self-dealing, and serving
the best interests of the principal.435 A similar relationship of trust and confi-
dence, therefore, must possess essentially the same qualities as a fiduciary
relationship.436
To determine that Chestman violated Rule 10b-5 under the misappropri-
ation theory the court had to find that Keith breached a fiduciary relationship
owed to his family and that Chestman knew about the breach.437 The
appellate court concluded that Keith had neither a fiduciary relationship nor
another relationship of trust and confidence sufficient to establish a breach
429. See id. (stating that disclosing confidential information, by itself, does not create
fiduciary duty).
430. See id. at 568 (finding that family relationship alone does not create fiduciary
obligation). The court stated that "more than a gratuitous reposal of a secret to another who
happens to be a family member is required to establish a fiduciary or similar relationship
of trust and confidence." Id.
431. Id. (citations omitted).
432. See id. at 568-71 (finding that Keith Loeb was neither fiduciary of Susan nor
fiduciary of Waldbaum family).
433. Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
434. See id. (concluding that "[a] similar relationship of trust and confidence, therefore,
must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship").
435. See id. at 569 (discussing characteristics of fiduciary relationship).
436. See id. (concluding that similar relationship of trust and confidence must share
qualities of fiduciary relationship).
437. See id. at 570 (stating requirements for conviction of Chestman).
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under the misappropriation theory.4 8 Familial relationships alone are not
enough, and the Government presented no additional evidence to convert
Keith's relationship into one of fiduciary stature or a similar relationship of
trust.439 Absent any fraud committed by Keith, Chestman could not have
derivatively violated Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory, and
therefore, the court reversed the securities fraud convictions.'
Chestman is an important decision for understanding the misappropria-
tion theory. The Second Circuit recognized the extremely broad holding
of Carpenter and the problems the decision created." The vague language
in Carpenter suggests a limitless application of the theory because of the
numerous types of relationships in which confidential information is
discussed." 2 The Second Circuit recognized this problem and declined to
extend the misappropriation theory to family relationships without a clear
showing of a fiduciary relationship between family members. 3 The court,
however, should have overruled Carpenter and eliminated the misappropria-
tion theory. Instead, it tried to define the scope of the predicate relation-
ship,444 albeit unconvincingly because of the many relationships in which
confidential information is discussed. The Chestman decision fails to provide
clear notice to those individuals who must determine whether their relation-
ship is fiduciary in nature prior to trading on material nonpublic information.
Evaluating the relationship is of paramount importance because "a duty to
disclose does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market infor-
mation."I4 Considering that Chestman involved a six-to-five split of an en
banc court," 6 it is questionable whether this limited view of a relationship
will survive through the next misappropriation decision. As Judge Miner
quoted in his concurrence: "Prosecutors can often claim that some confiden-
438. See id. (finding that Keith Loeb did not breach relevant relationship). The court
had "little trouble finding the evidence insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship or its
functional equivalent between Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family." Id.
439. See id. at 570-71 (discussing lack of evidence to support conviction).
440. See id. at 571 (reversing Rule 10b-5 convictions).
441. See id. at 567 (noting broad holding of Carpenter).
442. See id. (stating that fiduciary relationships outside fiduciary/shareholder context
lack clear definition).
443. See id. at 568-71 (refusing to apply misappropriation theory to Keith Loeb's
actions).
444. See id. at 567-70 (discussing qualities of fiduciary relationship or similar relation-
ship of trust).
445. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
446. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(noting vote of each judge), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
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tial relationship was abused - whether between lovers, family members,
longtime friends, or simply that well known confidential relationship between
a bartender and drunk. Such a test inherently creates legal uncertainty and
invites selective prosecutions."' 7  As Justice Powell warned in Dirks:
"Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's strategy, but that can be hazardous .... I
In Chestman, the Second Circuit also attempted to define "a similar
relationship of trust and confidence. "449 Defining this statement is important
because of the expansive interpretation that the phrase imputes to the applica-
tion of the misappropriation theory. The court, however, simply concluded
that a similar relationship of trust and confidence is essentially the equivalent
of a fiduciary relationship.45 This "clarification" appears after the Second
Circuit admitted that fiduciary duties outside the context of shareholder/
fiduciary relationships lack definition and are anything but clear.45 Thus,
the court defined "a similar relationship of trust and confidence" using fidu-
ciary duty concepts that the court itself admitted are ambiguous.452 This
definition is subject to the same problems as determining the existence of
a fiduciary relationship, and therefore, is of little assistance.
Chestman is a disappointing decision by the en banc Second Circuit that
just barely - because of the six-to-five split - recognized that the misappro-
priation theory, as delineated in Carpenter, presented serious problems of
application and understanding. Determining the existence of a fiduciary
relationship outside of traditional relationships is a difficult task at best. Yet,
considering some of the individuals convicted under the misappropriation
theory for violating this relationship,4 it is important to establish some
447. Id. at 583 (Miner, J., concurring) (quoting John C. Coffee, Outsider Trading, That
New Crime, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1990, at 16).
448. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.24 (1983).
449. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567-70 (attempting to define similar relationship of
trust and confidence).
450. See id. at 568 (asserting that similar relationship of trust and confidence possesses
qualities of fiduciary relationship).
451. See id. at 567 (noting that fiduciary duties outside shareholder/fiduciary relation-
ship are not clear).
452. See id. at 567-69 (stating that similar relationship of trust and confidence has
qualities of fiduciary relationship, but also admitting difficulty of determining existence of
fiduciary relationship outside shareholder/fiduciary relationship).
453. See generally, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding
fiduciary duty between individual and former employer); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th
Cir. 1990) (finding fiduciary duty between employee and employer); United States v. Car-
penter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding fiduciary duty between newspaper and colum-
nist), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v. Willis, 737
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definitions. Elimination of the misappropriation theory would yield a more
equitable and desirable result and would reinstate the clear guidelines of
Chiarella and Dirks.
VII. The Fourth Circuit Rejects the Misappropriation Theory
In United States v. Bryan,4' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit completely rejected the misappropriation theory.455 Elton
Bryan worked for West Virginia as the Director of the West Virginia Lot-
tery.456 Bryan manipulated two government contracts involving the Lottery,
one for an advertising campaign and the other involving the purchase of
interactive video lottery machines. 4' In each case, Bryan rigged the selec-
tion process to insure that a desired company received the contract. 8
During Bryan's tenure as Lottery Director, he also engaged in securities
transactions with shares of companies that did business with the West
Virginia Lottery.4 9 Bryan used material nonpublic information obtained
through his position as Lottery Director for the securities transactions.4
The United States charged Bryan with two counts of mail fraud stemming
from the manipulated contracts, one count of violating Rule 10b-5 and Sec-
tion 10(b), one count of wire fraud arising from the securities trades, and
one count of perjury. The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of West Virginia convicted Bryan on all counts. 461
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the two mail fraud convictions,
the wire fraud conviction, and the perjury conviction. 2 However, the court
reversed the securities fraud conviction because Bryan's Rule 10b-5
conviction rested on the misappropriation theory, which the Fourth Circuit
F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding fiduciary duty between psychiatrist and patient);
United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding fiduciary duty
between husband and wife), rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 1004 (1992); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding
fiduciary duty between father and son), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.
1985).
454. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
455. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting use of
misappropriation theory for Rule 10b-5 enforcement).
456. Id. at 936.
457. Id. at 936-39.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 939.
460. Id.




refused to adopt. 3 The court of appeals attacked the theory on two fronts:
First, because the theory contradicted the language of Section 10(b) as
interpreted by the Supreme Court; and second, because the court determined
that policy considerations demanded rejection of the theory. '
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by discussing the elements and
the applicability of the misappropriation theory to Bryan's actions.' Re-
viewing the theory, the court found that the fraud required for a Rule 10b-5
action under the misappropriation theory occurs when a person "misappropri-
ates material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or some
other relationship of trust and confidence."' The appellate court noted that
the victim of the fraud need not be a purchaser or a seller, be in any way
affiliated with the securities transaction, nor have any interest in the trans-
action. 467 Finally, the fraud satisfies the in connection requirement because
the violator subsequently uses the information in a stock transaction."6 The
court of appeals concluded that Bryan's conduct clearly violated Section
10(b) under the misappropriation theory because Bryan used information
entrusted to him by the nature of his position and then traded on it. 9
However, the Fourth Circuit decided that the relevant inquiry was not
Bryan's behavior, but whether the misappropriation theory is a valid
enforcement mechanism for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.47 °
Following the Supreme Court's consistent admonition not to expand the
concept of fraud beyond the statute, the appellate court stated that "manipula-
tion and deception are the touchstones of Section 10(b) liability ....
Because manipulation is "virtually a term of art," 4n the interpretation of
463. See id. at 944-59 (discussing and refusing to adopt misappropriation theory for
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 enforcement).
464. See id. at 943-53 (rejecting misappropriation theory (1) because it does not comply
with § 10(b) and (2) because of policy considerations).
465. See id. at 944-45 (delineating misappropriation theory and discussing application
to Bryan's actions).
466. Id. at 944 (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1991)
(en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992)).
467. See id. (stating that source of information need not be associated with stock trans-
action).
468. See id. (discussing in connection requirement).
469. See id. at 945 (concluding that Bryan's conduct violated misappropriation theory).
470. See id. (stating that relevant inquiry should not focus on Bryan's conduct but on
validity of misappropriation theory).
471. See id. (following Supreme Court's advice and precedent by concluding that
manipulation and deception formed bases of § 10(b) violations).
472. Id. (citations omitted).
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"deception" in Section 10(b) limits the interpretation and application of fraud
under Rule lOb-5.473 The ultimate question, then, is whether the fraud com-
mitted under the misappropriation theory - a breach of a fiduciary duty to
the source of the information who is not connected to the securities trans-
action - is deception under Section 10(b). 474
The Fourth Circuit stated that the Santa Fe Court defined deception in
the context of Section 10(b) either as a material misrepresentation or as a
breach of an affirmative duty to disclose.47 In deciding Santa Fe, the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that Section 10(b) applied to breaches of
fiduciary duties without deception.476 The Fourth Circuit noted that the
Court, in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,a' recently reaffirmed this
conclusion478 and stated that "Section 10(b) does not 'reach[ ] breaches of
473. See id. (stating that Rule cannot exceed language of statute).
474. See id. at 946 (determining focus of analysis). The court stated that the:
[Slpecific concern is whether the Rule's prohibition of "fraud" "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security," which can be read no more broadly
than the statutory prohibition of "deception" "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security," . . . may extend to breaches of fiduciary duty involving the
misappropriation of confidential information from one who is neither a purchaser
nor seller of securities, or otherwise connected with a securities transaction.
Id.
475. See id. (noting that Supreme Court defined "deception" in Santa Fe).
476. Id. (interpreting Santa Fe and stating that § 10(b) does not cover mere breaches
of fiduciary duty). In Santa Fe, the Court stated that "the claim of fraud and fiduciary
breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any part of Rule lob-5 only if the
conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of
the statute." Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
477. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
478. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446-48 (1994)
(reaffirming that Rule lob-5 violation requires manipulation or deception). In Central Bank,
the Supreme Court eliminated aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) for private civil
actions. Id. at 1448. The Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (the
Authority) issued $26 million worth of bonds in 1986 and 1988 to finance public improve-
ments. Id. at 1443. Landowner assessment liens secured the bonds and the bond covenants
required that the value of the land equal at least 160% of the outstanding principal and
interest. Id. Central Bank of Denver (Central Bank) served as indenture trustee for the
issues. Id. AmWest Development (AmWest), the developer of Stetson Hills, gave Central
Bank an annual report comparing the land values with the 160% requirement. Id. Prior to
the June 1988 issue, Central Bank received information that the land values had declined and
that they did not meet the 160% test mandated by the covenants. Id. However, Central
Bank chose to postpone a thorough analysis of the land values until the end of 1988, six
months after the bond issue. Id. After the 1988 issue and prior to the completion of the
land value appraisal, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds. Id. First Interstate Bank
of Denver (First Interstate Bank) and Jack Naber purchased more than $2 million of 1988
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fiduciary duty . . . without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of
disclosure."'479 In eliminating aiding and abetting liability, the Court agreed
that although this behavior is improper in some instances, fairness consider-
ations could not alter the holding dictated by the language of Section 10(b).41°
The Fourth Circuit then analyzed who must suffer the deception in a
Section 10(b) action."' The appellate court noted that the Supreme Court
has consistently stated that Section 10(b) is concerned only with deception
performed on purchasers or sellers of securities or, at most, other parties
with a vested interest in the transaction.' The court stated that the Supreme
Court "has left no doubt that the principle concern of Section 10(b) is the
protection of purchasers and sellers of securities. "I' This protection of
investors supplied the premise for both Chiarella and Dirks.4 4 The Fourth
Circuit also interpreted an aspect of the Central Bank decision to support
the purchaser or seller limitation of Section 10(b). 4
bonds. Id. They brought suit against the Authority, an AmWest official, Central Bank, and
two underwriters, claiming various violations of § 10(b). Id. The United States Districi
Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to Central Bank but the Tenth
Circuit reversed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and eliminated
aiding and abetting liability for private actions under § 10(b). Id. at 1445-50. The Court
primarily relied on the language of § 10(b) and concluded that the statutory language did not
provide liability for aiding and abetting. Id. at 1445-48. The Court stated that "[ilt is
inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope
of conduct prohibited by the statutory text." Id. at 1448. The statutory language of § 10(b)
simply did not preclude aiding and abetting. Id.
See Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not Just the End
of Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387 (1995), for a
discussion of Central Bank and its ramifications.
479. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Central Bank,
114 S. Ct. at 1446). Later in Central Bank, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this conclusion
and stated that "[a]s in earlier cases considering conduct prohibited by § 10(b), we again
conclude that the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission)
or the commission of a manipulative act." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
480. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448 (refusing to consider policy issues because
statute is explicit on its face). The Court stated that "[t]he issue, however, is not whether
imposing private civil liability on aiders and abetters is good policy but whether aiding and
abetting is covered by the statute." Id.
481. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946-48 (analyzing purchaser or seller requirement).
482. See id. at 946 (stating that victim must be purchaser, seller, or other person
closely connected with transaction for actionable § 10(b) claim).
483. Id. at 946-47.
484. See id. at 947 (stating that investor protection is basis of Chiarella and Dirks
decisions).
485. See id. (citing Central Bank as supporting purchaser or seller limitation).
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After establishing that, in the context of fraudulent nondisclosure, the
scope of Section 10(b) only addresses deception performed on actual pur-
chasers or sellers, or on others with a vested interest in the transaction,"6
the Fourth Circuit analyzed the misappropriation theory under the purview
of Section 10(b).1 First, the court noted that the misappropriation theory
requires only a breach of a fiduciary duty or some other relationship of trust
and confidence, and not an affirmative act of deception." Such a breach
is not necessarily deceptive as defined by the Supreme Court.4 9 Second,
under the misappropriation theory, the victim of the deception need not be
the party trading opposite to the violator nor a market participant at all.
4 9°
The appellate court determined that this particular result conflicted with
precedent by eliminating the requirement that a market participant suffer the
deception.491 The court stated that by eliminating the requirement that a
market participant suffer the fraud, the misappropriation theory converted
the securities laws into "a federal common law governing and protecting any
and all trust relationships."49I The court of appeals noted that the protection
of fiduciary or trust relationships is not the purpose of the securities laws .493
Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the misappropriation theory
is faulty for two reasons: First, the fraud under the theory is broader than
the deception defined by Section 10(b) as construed by the Supreme Court;
and second, the victim of the fraud is not necessarily connected in any
manner to the securities transaction. 49'
486. See id. at 946-48 (discussing scope of § 10(b) and concluding that it applied to
deception performed on actual purchasers or sellers).
487. See id. at 949-50 (analyzing misappropriation theory under limits of § 10(b)).
488. See id. at 949 (finding that misappropriation theory does not require deception).
The court stated that "by its own terms, the misappropriation theory does not even require
deception, but rather allows the imposition of liability upon the mere breach of a fiduciary
relationship or similar relationship of trust and confidence." d.
489. See id. (noting that misappropriation theory only requires breach of fiduciary duty
that is not necessarily deceptive).
490. See id. at 949-50 (stating that victim of deception need not be purchaser or seller).
The court noted that "the theory still does not require deception violative of a duty of fair
representation or disclosure owed to a market participant, i.e., deception in connection with
a purchase or sale of securities." Id. at 949.
491. See id. at 949-50 (finding that misappropriation theory contradicts precedent by
eliminating requirement that market participant suffer fraud).
492. Id. at 950.
493. See id. (finding that Congress did not intend for securities laws to protect non-
securities relationships).
494. See id. (concluding that misappropriation theory is faulty because it does not
require deception and because victim is neither purchaser nor seller). The court stated that:
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Despite the Fourth Circuit's determination that precedent and textual
analysis were sufficient to reject the misappropriation theory, the court
discussed various policy reasons behind its rebuff.4' The court noted that
the Supreme Court has stated that securities laws demand predictability.
496
Moreover, market participants need guidance, and absent clear laws and
interpretations, investors might find themselves victims of the SEC's spon-
taneous decisionmaking and enforcement strategy.4' With this axiomatic
premise in mind, the court of appeals noted the extreme uncertainty that the
misappropriation theory introduced into securities fraud enforcement.49 The
culprit of this uncertainty is the theory's crux - the simple breach of a
fiduciary duty.4" Basing the theory on a breach of a fiduciary duty is prob-
lematic because the duty is difficult to define. As the court noted: "[AIl-
though fifteen years have passed since the theory's inception, no court adopt-
ing the misappropriation theory has offered a principled basis for distinguish-
ing which types of fiduciary or similar relationships of trust and confidence
can give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability and which cannot."5" The appellate
court declared that the absence of clear guidelines for determining the nature
of relationships presents a formidable problem because the definition and
the regulation of relationships varies widely from state to state, from family
to family, and from employer to employer.5 0' Basing the federal securities
laws on such dramatic variations of relationships traditionally regulated by
states presents fairness and enforcement problems between jurisdictions and
In essence, the misappropriation theory disregards the specific statutory require-
ment of deception, in favor of a requirement of a mere fiduciary breach, and
then artificially divides into two discrete requirements - a fiduciary breach and
a purchase or sale of securities - the single indivisible requirement of deception
upon the purchaser or seller of securities, or upon some other person intimately
linked with or affected by a securities transaction. In doing so, the theory
effectively eliminates the requirement that a person in some way connected to a
securities transaction be deceived, allowing conviction not only where the "de-
frauded" person has no connection with a securities transaction, but where no
investor or market participant has been deceived.
Id.
495. See id. at 950-53 (discussing policy reasons for rejection of theory).
496. See id. at 950 (noting that Supreme Court has declared that securities laws need
predictability and certainty).
497. See id. at 950-51 (discussing importance of having clear rules).
498. See id. at 951 (stating that misappropriation theory introduced unpredictability into
securities laws).
499. See id. (claiming that breach of fiduciary duty is theory's "linchpin").
500. Id.
501. See id. (finding that relationships vary tremendously between different entities).
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would eventually lead to the "effective federalization of relationships his-
torically regulated by the states." 5I This, the Fourth Circuit stated, would
clearly violate Santa Fe's admonition not to use the federal securities laws
to regulate behavior traditionally left to the states. 3
For all of the above reasons, the Fourth Circuit rejected the use of the
misappropriation theory.' ° Certainly, the court did not condone Bryan's
behavior, but commented that "in securities law, as in all areas of the law,
our perceptions of what is wise or fair are ultimately of no relevance. "I
Notwithstanding a desire to punish Bryan for perceptibly unfair behavior in
trading on the material nonpublic information, the court concluded that "it
simply was not conduct that is prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. " The court of appeals noted, however, that
Bryan's behavior surrounding the securities transactions would not go totally
unpunished: It sustained Bryan's conviction for the wire fraud stemming
from the securities transactions .
5 7
United States v. Bryan and its repudiation of the misappropriation theory
is a sound decision that is based on precedent and policy. The Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected any abstract ideas concerning fairness and, instead, remained
consistently guided by precedent. 8 Such precedent mandated the rejection
of the misappropriation theory."° The court focused on two elements of the
misappropriation theory that precedent dictates as inappropriate: First, the
502. Id.
503. See id. at 951-52 (stating that eventual result of misappropriation theory would
lead to federal fiduciary principle in contradiction of Santa Fe).
504. See id. at 952 (rejecting misappropriation theory). The court stated its holding:
Accordingly, we hold that criminal liability under Section 10(b) cannot be predi-
cated upon the mere misappropriation of information in breach of a fiduciary duty
owed to one who is neither a purchaser nor seller of securities, or in any other
way connected with, or financially interested in, an actual or proposed purchase
or sale of securities, even when such a breach is followed by the purchase or sale
of securities. Such conduct simply does not constitute fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, within the meaning of Section 10(b).
Id.
505. Id. at 959.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 943.
508. See id. at 943-50 (using Supreme Court precedent to reject misappropriation
theory).
509. See id. at 950 (noting that text of § 10(b), as interpreted by Supreme Court, was
sufficient to reject misappropriation theory). The court noted, however, that "[albsent
guidance from the Supreme Court, the language of the Rule, if not of the statute, could
plausibly accommodate the misappropriation theory." Id. at 945.
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lack of any deception in using the confidential information; and second, the
commission of the fraud on the source of the information, not on the
opposite party to the securities transaction."'
The Fourth Circuit began its thorough analysis of precedent by properly
interpreting Santa Fe to define fraud under Rule 10b-5 by the "manipulative
or deceptive" language of Section 10(b).5 1' The mere breach of a fiduciary
duty, without more, is not deceptive under the statute. 12 Applying this to
the misappropriation theory, the appellate court noted that the theory only
requires that the violator breach some type of a fiduciary duty in using the
entrusted information - deception is not an element." 3 The court rightly
concluded that this result clearly contradicts the holding of Santa Fe. 4
Misappropriation without deception simply does not violate Rule lOb-5.
The Fourth Circuit then properly determined that Supreme Court
precedent focused on investors and not on the source of confidential infor-
mation.5  Section 10(b) requires that the fraud occur "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.""1 6 The court correctly stated that Rule
10b-5 applies only to purchasers, sellers, or others with a vested interest in
the securities transaction. 7 Otherwise, "the statutory requirement that the
510. See id. at 945-50 (focusing on definition of fraud and victim of fraud).
511. See id. at 945-46 (interpreting Santa Fe); see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 473-76 (1977) (requiring manipulation or deception for finding of fraud under
Rule lOb-5).
512. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that Santa
Fe stated that § 10(b) does not prohibit mere breaches of fiduciary duty); see also Santa Fe,
430 U.S. at 472 (refusing to extend § 10(b) to all breaches of fiduciary duty).
513. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949 (finding that misappropriation theory does not require
any deception, only breach of fiduciary duty).
514. See id. (concluding that misappropriation theory does not comply with Santa Fe
holding).
515. See id. at 946-50 (finding that Supreme Court's precedent primarily concerned
investors); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (discussing how duty to
disclose arises from relationship between parties to securities transaction and not simply
from possession of material nonpublic information); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 228-30 (1980) (finding that duty to disclose arises from relationship between members
of securities transaction); Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478-80 (noting that Rule 10b-5 neither
supplies federal fiduciary standard nor protects against simple corporate mismanagement);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976) (finding that purpose of federal
securities regulations is to protect investors); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (allowing only actual purchasers or sellers to bring private Rule lOb-5
actions).
516. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)); see supra note 4 (providing text of § 10(b)).
517. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating limits of
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fraud be in connection with the purchase or sale of securities ... [will] be
rendered meaningless." '518 The holdings of Dirks, Chiarella, and Blue Chip
Stamps assisted the Fourth Circuit with its reasoning. 19 Finding that both
Dirks and Chiarella required that the duty to disclose arise from the relation-
ship between the parties to a transaction, the Fourth Circuit determined that
the primary purpose of Section 10(b) is the protection of purchasers and
sellers of securities.5' The court noted that the relationship between the
parties - not mere possession of confidential information - creates the duty
to disclose and that Section 10(b) protects against violations of that relation-
ship." The Blue Chip Stamps decision also supplied persuasive precedent
in its limitation that a person must be an actual purchaser or seller before
bringing a civil action under Section 10(b).1 Although Blue Chip Stamps
did not specifically apply, the court noted the soundness of the decision's
statutory interpretation and asserted that the case provided additional sup-
port.5' The appellate court's conclusion limiting Section 10(b) to purchas-
ers, sellers, or others with a vested interest in the transaction is commendable
and correct. Because the misappropriation theory lacks any requirement of
deception and does not require that a participant to the securities transaction
suffer the fraud, the Fourth Circuit properly rejected the theory's application
for Rule lOb-5 enforcement.
The court's policy arguments also provided impressive support for the
theory's repudiation." The concern that the securities laws might provide
insufficient guidance to investors primarily troubled the court." Without
clearly defined rules, investors could unknowingly subject themselves to
discretionary enforcement by the SEC."a The court correctly noted that the
Rule 10b-5).
518. Id.
519. See id. at 946-48 (discussing purchaser or seller requirement for Rule lob-5 and
citing precedent).
520. See id. at 946-47 (stating that primary purpose of § 10(b) is to protect investors).
521. See id. (interpreting Chiarella and Dirks and asserting that purpose of § 10(b) is
to protect purchasers and sellers).
522. See id. at 947-48 (relying on Blue Chip Stamps to support conclusion limiting
§ 10(b) to purchaser or sellers); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 733-49 (1975) (limiting private actions under § 10(b) to actual purchasers or sellers).
523. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 94748 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing Blue
Chip Stamps).
524. See id. at 950-53 (discussing policy reasons for rejection of misappropriation
theory).
525. See id. at 950-51. (noting that securities laws should provide clear rules).
526. See id. (demonstrating concern for investors in absence of clear guidelines).
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misappropriation theory conflicted with these goals of providing clear
securities laws.' The Fourth Circuit properly recognized that the theory
introduces tremendous uncertainty into the securities laws because of its
vague requirement that a violator breach a fiduciary duty or some other
relationship of trust and confidence.' This uncertainty leads to selective
enforcement, and eventually, would require a federal fiduciary standard
because of the varying fiduciary duties. 9 The court persuasively stated that
federal enforcement of a fiduciary standard conflicts with the Supreme
Court's refusal in Santa Fe to extend Rule 10b-5 over areas traditionally left
to state law. 3 The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Bryan cor-
rectly interprets the text of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, properly analyzes
Supreme Court precedent, and provides significant policy arguments for
rejection of the misappropriation theory.
VIII. Conclusion
A former SEC Commissioner suggested that the misappropriation theory
"is merely a pretext for enforcing equal opportunity in information." 31 This
observation appears to be correct. Since Texas Gulf Sulphur the Second
Circuit has attempted to implement the discredited parity of information
theory. The Second Circuit, along with the SEC, attempted to apply
nebulous concerns of fairness and consistently read Rule 10b-5 more expan-
sively than the statutory language of Section 10(b) allowed. The misappro-
priation theory is simply the most recent device intended to establish parity
of information. The theory is pretextual - a hidden motivation lies in
the Second Circuit's and the SEC's infatuation with ridding the securities
markets of behavior that they deem unfair, regardless of whether the conduct
violates Section 10(b). This rationale is seductive. Who can argue against
fairness? However, as the Fourth Circuit noted and as the Supreme Court
has consistently expressed, concerns of fairness are not only subordinate to
Section 10(b), but completely irrelevant. This is not to say that the behavior
527. See id. at 951 (finding that misappropriation theory introduced uncertainty into
securities laws).
528. See id. (stating that misappropriation theory's requirement of breach of fiduciary
duty introduced uncertainty into securities laws).
529. See id. at 951-52 (discussing ramifications of misappropriation theory).
530. See id. (evaluating possible response to securities laws enforcement based on wide
array of fiduciary duties); see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)
(refusing to extend Rule lob-5 to areas traditionally regulated by state law).
531. Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 353, 366 (1988).
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of Newman, Materia, Carpenter, Chestman, or Bryan is admirable. Quite
the contrary, most were scoundrels who acted out of pure greed. They were
not, however, perpetrators of Section 10(b) violations. Their conduct simply
did not constitute securities fraud as the statute is written. If Congress
concludes that their behavior should be illegal, then Congress should enact
legislation to clarify federal -insider trading enforcement law. Regardless,
the misappropriation theory contradicts precedent, protects relationships
instead of investors, requires the evaluation of vague concepts of fiduciary
duties, and does not provide clear guidelines for prospective enforcement.
The elimination of the misappropriation theory of insider trading enforcement
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